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Baldwin: The Impact of the Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights Doctrine

THE IMPACT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ON THE
RIPARIAN RIGHTS DOCTRINE
FLETcHEm

N.

BALiDwiN, JR.*

In 1963 few, if any, areas of the law do not in some way involve the
national government.1 With the rapid increase of federal activity and
power has come controversy. Generally this controversy is an outgrowth of various federal statutes, proposals, or constitutional interpretations favoring the national government, causing state, local, or
individual interests to be adversely affected. It is not surprising, then,
that the scapegoat for much state and individual indignation is the
United States Supreme Court.
One subject eliciting vociferous dispute is the present state of the
federal water resource development program,2 an area of federal
activity made possible to a great extent by the Supreme Court's
development and interpretation of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. This is not merely a political dispute. As the
Negro revolution of the sixties has its far-reaching effects into every
area of American life, so too the repercussions of various water regulations are keenly felt by individual and corporate groups.3 The water
problem is not one that will disappear with time. It must be examined
critically and studied seriously to determine the very best methods of
control, be that control at the federal or state level or through various
cooperative ventures supported by each.
Since the United States is a comparatively youthful nation, there are
relatively few settled aspects of federal power. Water resource development is no exception. The conflict existing in the area of water
law, as in the other federal-state wrestlings, has caused grave concern.4 Although disapproval is often very audible, fortunately, most
citizens are willing to abide by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, acting as the ultimate arbiter. Today the settlement
of proper state-federal relationships is usually not so dramatic as it
was one hundred years ago but, hopefully, is more effective.
of Georgia; LL.M. 1962, University of
Illinois; Member of Georgia Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. See generally, e.g., BEcX, Tim VANismNG MomHTs oF T=E STATES (1926);
GLLHOIT, INDrvJuAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAwes (1956); Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw & CoNmTsm1. PRoB.
325 (1957). Professor Englebert states that in the area of water resources development, as in no other, "federalism" is "starkly presented."
2. Englebert, supra note 1.
3. See S. REP. No. 29 1-7, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
4. See, e.g., Taylor, Excess Land Law: Secretary's Decision? A Study in Administration of Federal-StateRelations, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1962).
* B.A. 1958, LL.B. 1961, University
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In order to fully examine the federal and state roles in the water
resource development area, the conflicting interests involved must be
recognized as a major factor in the development of a national policy
on the utilization of our water resources. The following examination
will stress the effect of the commerce clause upon the riparian rights
doctrine as evinced in most of the states east of the Mississippi River.,
In the arid western states the water problems are readily identifiable and have been recognized as being acute by almost all interested
parties for many years. 6 Hence, these private and public parties have
been eager to find solutions to their water problems and have
examined the United States Constitution to see whether it could be
relevant to their needs.
Generally in the eastern states, water still seems to be in abundance; thus it has not been of immediate concern to the public. The
general notion that seems to have always prevailed, is that the eastern
portion of the United States is blessed with an unlimited supply of
water that will always be freely and readily available for human
5. Justice Story has explained riparian rights in the following manner: "Prima
facie every proprietor upon each bank of a river ... has a right to the use of
the water flowing over it in its natural current, without diminution or obstruction.
...
[Tibe right being common to all the proprietors on the river, no one has a
right to diminish the quantity which will, according to the natural current, flow
to a proprietor below.... I do not mean to be understood, as holding the doctrine that there can be no dimunition whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for
that would be to deny any valuable use of it. There may be, and there must be
allowed of that, which is common to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the
principle and extent of the use is, whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not. There may be a diminution in quantity, or a retardation or acceleration of the natural current indispensable for the general and valuable use of the
water, perfectly consistent with the existence of the common right." Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (No. 14312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827). For a more
comprehensive study of the riparian rights doctrine see Bunny, REAL PNoPETY
56-60 (2d ed. 1954); GouLD, ThE LAW Or WATEs 296-447 (3d ed. 1900);
LAUER, THE

RiPABRI

RrICrs As PNtoPERTY IN WATER REsouncEs AND THE LAW

133, 167-69 (1958); Agnor, Riparian Rights in the SoutheasternStates, 5 S.C.L.Q.
141 (1952); Coudert, Riparian Rights; A Perversion of Stare Decisis, 9 CoLum.
L. REv. 217 (1909); Hunt, Riparian Rights in Flofida, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 393
(1955). Most eastern states, that is most of the 26 states east of the Mississippi
River plus Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Missouri, the five states on
the western bank, have in one form or another the basic riparian doctrine of
private rights to the use of stream water. Iowa and Mississippi have departed
from the riparian doctrine for what they believe to be more workable water use
codes; LAER, supra. The riparian doctrine has been recognized in different degrees in several western states; 3 U.S. EP. OF = PEsmENS's WATER RFsoUmca
POLICY CoNa. 155-56 (1950).
6. See Taylor, supra note 4.
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needs. 7 Unfortunately, such an attitude is not realistic. Those responsible for water resource development have recognized the possibility
of a serious water shortage in the East unless present riparian laws
are at least modified to meet twentieth century demands. 8
Thus, this study deals largely with the frequently inadequate
riparian laws of the states east of the Mississippi River.
Many eastern states have waited so long to take the initiative in
water studies that their laxity has required federal remedial action.
Any state action now must first be concurred in by the national
government. Through the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the commerce clause, it is all but impossible to enter the water
arena independent of federal influence.9
Every stage of development of the United States has added new
responsibilities to the governmental functions. Water control and river
regulation are no exception. Federal action in water regulation, at
least in the area of the improvement of navigation, probably began
with the purchase of the Territory of Louisiana in 1803.10 It was not
until after the advent of the steamboat in 1807, however, that the
necessity for improving river channels presented a preview of an
inevitable federal-state clash.
Flood control, another aspect of the water development program,
was initially the responsibility of the individual landowner. Later it
was shared by counties and special districts organized for such purposes. As the task reached seemingly gigantic proportions, interest
groups began petitioning the federal government to participate in
flood control. The Congress refused to assume responsibility until
1879, when, with the creation of the Mississippi River Commission,
results were achieved that could not have been realized by individual,
county, or state action.11
Theodore Roosevelt, in his first message to Congress in 1901, spoke
of the conservation of natural resources of forests, minerals, and water
power as "the most vital internal question of the United States."' 2 At
points in American history when states were unable to cope with
7. See SrAF oF SENATE SELcr Comm. oN NAT'L WATER RESOURCES, 87TH
(Comm. Print 1961);
LAuER, supra note 5, at 166.
8. STAFF OF SENATE SELEcr Co n. ON NAr'L WATER REsoURcmS, 86Ta CONG.,
2D SESs., REPORT ON WATER SUPPLY AND DmEwND (Comm. Print 1960); 1 Forer,
CONG., IST SESs., REPORT ON NAT'L WATER RESoURCES

Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 H-Anv. L. REv. 832 (1961);
Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
9. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALo L. REV.
399, 400-01 (1961).
10. 1 SmE, A_,mnc~A WATm REsoURCE A mImTnATioN 142 (1956).
11. -ANT, Tim Powm IRDUSTRY AN THE PU
c INTEREST 139 (1944).
12. MUzzEY. A HISTORY oF OUR CouNTRY 431 (1950).
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emergency water problems, the federal government frequently
stepped in and provided assistance.1 3
A study of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the commerce
clause reveals the foundation of a national water resource program,
capable of averting future water shortage if not hindered by pressure
groups attempting to influence Congress for individual gain.14 At the
present stage of the development and utilization of water resources,
it appears that the national government can provide for the optimal
utility of the water resources available. 15
Some of the success in the water resource development field can be
attributed to national aggressiveness. Surely much of the credit must
be given to the states for their inadequate planning and poor water
education. Most of the eastern states have failed to exploit effectively
their opportunities or to control wisely their water resources. A consistent position has not been maintained with respect to both their
power and responsibility; nor have they formulated adequate policies
to guide them in their relationship with the national government in
control of water use and conservation.16 It appears that when economic conditions are good, the states tend to emphasize states' rights
and deplore national encroachments; even during prosperous times the
states generally fail to recognize water problems and to provide
needed leadership to desired water projects.1 7 However, when there
are periods of economic decline, the states are quick to shift their
self-ordained responsibilities to the national level.1 8 Two decades of
shifting responsibility to the national government, during the great
depression and World War II, have greatly abetted the growth of
national control.' 9
Only as the Madison Avenue soap, beer, and cigarette commercials
are interspersed with dramatic public service pleas for water resource
13. The Act of 1894 allowed states in arid regions to take over large tracts of
public land for improvement by irrigation. Work lagged because the states could
not afford the projects. Theodore Roosevelt stepped in with government aid. In
1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed even greater responsibility for the
welfare of the people at large and strengthened the powers of the national government.
14. For example, note the remarks of Senator Douglas aimed at certain state
pressure groups in 105 CoNG. E. 7674 (1959). See also 29 ENcYC. AMERICANA
23(1959).
15. COMN ON RGcANIZTION OF THE ExECUTrvE BRANcH oF Tmx CoVERNmT, TAs, Foncn ON WATE RsouRcxs AND Pown 213-32 (1955).

16. Trelease, supra note 9, at 401-07.
17. Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw &
CoNqp. ThoB. 325, 330-31 (1957).
18. Ibid. See also Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75
HAv. L. REv. 332, 338-39 (1961).
19. See generally Engelbert, supra note 17, at 330-34.
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concern does the individual citizen become cognizant of the nation's
water problems. During the past several years the media of mass
communication have alerted the American public to some aspects of
our water problem, but any interruption of a television show with an
educational message is frequently viewed as an invasion of leisure
time. Furthermore, a look at the present relationship among federal,
state, and individual rights reveals that the states following the riparian rights doctrines have awakened to the need for relevant water law
studies and changes only to discover that the United States Supreme
Court has already given the Congress a secure hold in the elusive
balance of power.
THE FOMULATION OF A LIVmNG CONSTITUTION

The Constitution was drafted for an eighteenth century agrarian
republic of some three-and-one-half million persons sparsely populating the eastern seaboard area. Yet, one hundred and seventy-five
years later this same Constitution functions as the fundamental law
of a great urban industrial democracy of some 190 million persons
crowding much of the three-and-a-half million square miles of the
republic.
It is difficult to believe that in the summer of 1787 fifty-five delegates from twelve states20 could visualize, even in their wildest
2 1 Historidreams, the United States of the mid-twentieth* century.
ans tell us that these able and experienced men were aware of their
hour of decision in attempting to form a new government. James
Madison, the brilliant scholar and public servant, and James Wilson,
an outstanding eighteenth century legal theorist, voiced their desire
for a constitution that would promote a strong national government.
The Constitution that was developed was essentially practical; its
basis was political rather than economic; 2 2 it was an expression of
eighteenth century political ideas and of unswerving faith in the supremacy of reason.
Had it not been an instrument of extraordinary flexibility, the Constitution would not have survived the decisive tests of time and socioeconomic change. The provisions are sufficiently specific and detailed
to provide the necessary element of governmental stability. At the
same time, the Constitution is broad and general enough in its institutional arrangements and grants of power to allow for the steady
20. There was no appointment made by Rhode Island to the 1787 Convention.
See 1 ELLxoT, DEBATES 124 (2d ed. 1836).
1 21. WAREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTiUToN, ANiD THE Surpnmi
CounT 7
(1935).
22. Tns A mmlcAN HEiA E, THE noEE Spmrr 110-14 (1959).
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growth of a "living constitution" to meet the changing world order
needs.

23

The life of the nation has helped to mould the warp and woof of
the constitutional system. Actual governmental practice, however,
has probably been the greatest single force in shaping the evolution
of the American constitutional system.2 4 In the span of time between
the formulation of the Constitution and the Civil War, congressional
debate was a major source of constitutional doctrine; in the last
ninety-five years, however, the Supreme Court has become the final
arbiter of the American constitutional system. Yet, to say that the
Constitution is what the Court says it is, avoids the point; if anything,
it could be argued that the last word in constitutional matters is not
the Court, but, in the final analysis, public opinion.
A review of the Court's decisions in selected water rights cases
reveals the elasticity of the Constitution and the commerce clause in
meeting twentieth century problems. The powers delegated to the
national government in 1787 were limited primarily to the areas of defense, finance, foreign policy, and commerce. Modem government
has had to deal with socio-economic problems resulting not only
from the areas important in 1787, but also from such developments as
mass production, mechanized agriculture, labor unions, hydro-electric power, population explosion, and water shortage. The Constitution cannot be effective as a living instrument of national authority
if it is merely a static charter of government. It is necessary that the
Constitution be interpreted in the light of modem problems. The
powers of the national government must be subjected to continual
reinterpretation and reconstruction to keep abreast of all aspects of
socio-economic life.25
The people .. .created this government.

They gave it a

constitution, and in that Constitution they have enumerated
the powers which they bestow on it. They have restrained it
to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others,
they declare, are reserved to the States or the people. But,
Sir, they have not stopped here. If they had, they would have
accomplished but half their work. No definition can be so
clear, as to avoid possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise,
as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall construe this
grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, Where it
may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do
23. KEmx & HARxisom, THE AmucAN CoNsTrrunoN 1-6 (1948).
24. WAmrmN,supra note 21, at 73-74. See also 1 WLouGaBy, THE CoNsriLAw OF THE UNrrn STATEs 42-75 (2d ed. 1929).
25. 3 WhasTm, THE Woixs OF DAu~mL WEBsTm 334-35 (11th ed. 1858).

TrnoNAL
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they repose this ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the
government? Sir, they have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it with the government itself, in its appropriate branches. Sir, the very chief end, the main design, for
what the whole Constitution was framed and adopted, was to
establish a government that should not be obliged to act
through State agency, or depend on State opinion and State discretion.
In order properly to effectuate and maintain this system, "the
people have wisely provided in the Constitution itself, a proper suit26
able mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law."
The people, through Congress in its first session, established "a
mode for bringing all questions of constitutional power to the final
27
decision of the Supreme Court. It then, Sir, became a government."
The question for examination arises in the tradition of the Supreme
Court. Has the Court limited the Government to traditional federal projects affecting only federal interest, or has it adopted a broader
role for the Constitution?
Tim EApLY DIEvELopmNT oF

=IE ComdwimcE CL~usE

The federal government has, under its authorized powers, established vast water regulations and resource development projects.
A look at the Court and its view of these federal programs will help
to gauge future federal and state relations in water development.
Furthermore, much of what the Court says in this area can also be
applied in most other areas of federal-state relations.
Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, the commerce
clause, Congress has been given the power, in part, to "regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States . . . " It
was not until 1824, thirty-five years after the establishment of the Constitution, that the Court was called upon for the first general interpretation of the nature and scope of the language of the commerce
clause as it applied to interstate commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden 8
26. ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Mr. Justice Jackson in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). It would appear that Marshall was not concerned with
distinguishing between interstate and intrastate regulation of commerce. His idea
appeared to center around any commerce concerning more than one state. Marshall's language has been construed not only as a consent to regulate but also to
prohibit. It would appear that Justice Story must also be given some credit for the
opinion in Gibbons. According to two New York newspapers (New York Statesman, March 4, 1824 and New York Commercial Advertiser, March 3, 1824) he
helped Marshall write the opinion after Marshall was injured as a result of a fall.
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Chief Justice Marshall discussed the commerce clause in handing
down the unanimous decision of the Court. He devoted himself to
four main points, which included the following questions: What does
the term "commerce" comprehend? To what extent may Congress
exercise its commercial regulatory power within the separate states?
Is congressional power to regulate interstate commerce exclusive?
Should the commerce power be interpreted broadly for the national
welfare or be construed strictly in order to protect the reserved police
power of the state?
The term "commerce," Chief Justice Marshall declared, encompasses more than "traffic"; it is "intercourse." He stated that the
regulation of commerce is the regulation of navigation and general
commercial relations. Although he failed to hold that the commerce
power was exclusive, Marshall 2concluded
his decision with the fol9
lowing strong nationalistic stand:
Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that
the powers expressly granted to the government of the Union
are to be contracted by construction, into the narrowest possible compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction will retain them, may, by a
course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these premises, explain away the Constitution
of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed,
to look at, but totally unfit for use . ... In such a case,
it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental
principles ....
At the time this case was decided, the Court was under serious
attack for previous nationalistic decisions. Chancellor James Kent,
who was thought at that time to be the most learned jurist in
America, had upheld Ogden and the steamboat monopoly act. Because it was a death blow to the steamship monopoly, Marshall's
opinion therefore was a popular one. Few people appreciated the
nationalistic implications of Gibbons, since the broader significance
of this opinion became evident only with time.
The power to regulate navigation and navigable waters was
0 In this case the Court
strengthened in Gilman v. Philadelphia."
See 1 WAXmEN, THE Sutmmcm COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsTOrtY 608 (rev. ed.
1926).
29. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 28, at 97.
30. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865). The commerce clause does not negate legislation of states that affects commerce so long as the legislation does not interfere
with existing federal regulations upon the same subject matter. Pound v. Turck,
95 U.S. (5 Otto) 459 (1877). See also 1 K NTr, Com.mNTAntEs 439 (1884).
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broadened the powers with which the federal government had to
work. Mr. Justice Swayne stated that in order to regulate navigation,
the Government must be permitted to keep the navigable waters
free from obstruction to navigation, "interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by
such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of
the evil and for the punishment of offenders." 3 '
The First Test of Navigability
The conclusion to be reached by analyzing the opinion in Gibbons
v. Ogden and the adoption of this language by Gilman, is that the
federal government can control "navigable" waters. However, all
waters are not navigable. The next step was to formulate a workable
test of navigability.32 The test, which came into use after The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh in 1851, was one of "navigability in fact."38
31. Compare the language in Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra note 30, at 725
with the opinion by Mr. Justice Nelson in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 432 (1855).
32. Since states have attempted (although in the last decade unsuccessfully)
to guard their rights in intrastate streams and obviously nonnavigable streams,
the Court was faced with the task of initially formulating a working rule that
would determine the navigability of a watercourse. The early definition was to
last as long as the federal government did not need the rights and privileges of a
nonnavigable intrastate waterway. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). But note the words of Mr. Justice Field in The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870): "The doctrine of the common law
as to the navigability of waters has no application in this country. Here the ebb
and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test
at all of the navigability of waters. There no waters are navigable in fact, or at
least to any considerable extent, which are not subject to the tide, and from this
circumstance tide water and navigable water there signify substantially the same
thing." Thus, another test of navigability must be developed. Mr. Justice Field
went on to state the proposition that rivers in the United States "must be regarded
as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States . . . when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water."
Id. at 563.
33. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) first paved
the way for the adoption of a navigability test by Mr. Justice Field in The Daniel
Ball. Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Court in Genesee Chief, rejected the
common law determination of navigability and further dismissed the tidal flow
test briefly discussed by Mr. Justice Story in The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
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This test did not distinguish interstate waterways from intrastate
waterways.3 4
In 1874, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine what
was meant by "navigability in fact." In The Montello35 the river in
question was not navigable at the time questioned, and without extensive improvements the river could not be used by vessels for shipping and commerce. The Court in this instance did not agree that
The Daniel Bal 36 decision, when speaking of "navigable in fact,"
meant that if the watercourse could under ordinary conditions be used
37
as a highway for commerce, then it was "navigable in fact."
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail
vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway. The
capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a
river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be
capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public
river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon
the water, whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or
by the agency of steam, are, or may become, the mode by
which a vast commerce can be conducted, and it would be a
mischievous rule that would exclude either in determining the
navigability of a river.
The next step for the Court to consider was the role of obstructions
in navigable waters. It seemed logically to follow that since the Court
had determined that navigable waters were in fact common highways,
the analogy needed to be taken to its obvious conclusion. A highway
signified the right of unobstructed free passage, and whatever inWheat.) 428 (1825). Taney, in effect, stated that the test for navigability should
be navigability in fact. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, supra at 456-57. The
test elaborated on in The Daniel Ball is most frequently quoted by later courts.
However, after Mr. Justice Reed finished reworking it in United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), Mr. Justice Field probably would not have
recognized it.
34. See, e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903). Here is one of the
early signs of what was to come when the Court approved the test of navigability

to include watercourses solely within one state, but connected onto navigable
waters of other states. The connecting link does not have to be navigable in fact.
Here then was another extension of navigability and federal control.

35. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
36. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
37. Supra note 35, at 441-42.
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terfered was a nuisance. So also, if an obstruction were to affect navigation, the Court permitted the Government to order its removal. The
Court left to the Government the power to determine whether a
'legal obstruction" did or did not affect interstate commerce on a
navigable stream. 8 Since there was no common law prohibiting such
obstructions, in the absence of a federal statute, obstructions and nuisances in navigable streams were generally held to be within the control of the states.3 9
By 1876, the rule had been crystallized to a fine degree of constitutional interpretation. There was no real objection by the states to
the fact that the Supreme Court interpreted federal power to regulate
commerce as including jurisdiction over navigable streams in order
to protect and effectuate interstate commerce. This permitted the
federal government to control all navigable waters of the United
States that were capable of affecting watercourses in a state other
than their place of origin.
South Carolina v. Georgia4 ° eliminated any opportunity for the
states to negate federal jurisdiction by compact with another state.41
Thus, the navigable waters connected with other navigable waters
38. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876); The
Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870). The power to regulate commerce
and navigation includes the power to determine what is an illegal obstruction. In
an earlier decision on this point, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), the Court skirts around the idea of control of
internal streams by the federal government under certain circumstances: "The
purely internal streams of a State which are navigable belong to the riparian owners to the thread of the stream, and, as such, they have a right to use the waters
and bed beneath, for their own private emolument, subject only to the public right
of navigation ....
In respect to these purely internal streams of a State, the

public right of navigation is exclusively under the control and regulation of the
state legislature; and in cases where these erections or obstructions to the navigation are constructed under a law of the state, or sanctioned by legislative author-

ity, they are neither a public nuisance subject to abatement, nor is the individual
who may have sustained special damage from their intereference with the public

use entitled to any remedy for his loss." Id. at 432; Justice Nelson was not ready
to manipulate the law to such a degree so as to include all waters for Congressional convenience. This was to come later. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) the Court allowed a Delaware authority to

erect a dam that completely closed off a small stream leading to navigable
waters.

See

also PnENlICE & EAGAN,

Ts COMlMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDRAL

(1898).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899).
40. 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876).
41. Until the federal government, through Congress, elects to act, state legislatures may enact legislation affecting navigation within the boundary of the state,
although even in this right, the power is limited. Under no circumstances would a
CONsTrrtuoN 116-17
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and forming a waterway to other states came within the power of the
federal government and would not be subject to state interference.
Furthermore, the state within which the almost completely isolated
stream is located could not obstruct or in any way impede, impair, or
42
defeat the federal right to the navigable waters.
InitialEffect of the Commerce Clause Upon NonnavigableStreams
Having determined what test should apply to navigable streams
and what rights states have with respect to them, the Court was
called upon to determine the navigability of particular streams. The
next question was what right does the national government have in
portions of streams obviously nonnavigable "in fact."
In 1898, this comparatively new problem came before the Court
as an appeal in a suit brought by the Government to restrain a private
company from constructing or in any way maintaining a dam across
the portion of the Rio Grande River which lay within the territory
of New Mexico. The ground upon which the Government predicated
its claim was that since the Rio Grande was a navigable river, the
proposed dam would obstruct navigation and interfere with its navigable capacity. The defendant denied that the portion of the Rio
Grande flowing through the territory of New Mexico was a navigable
river. The lower court agreed by taking judicial notice of the fact
that that portion of the Rio Grande within the territory was not a navigable stream. This position was upheld by the Supreme Court of
New Mexico.43 The decision was reversed in the Supreme Court of
the United States.44 The fact of nonnavigability did not affect the
reversal at all. The Court concurred on that point.4, However, the
Supreme Court did have to read into a federal statute then in effect,40 that nonnavigable as well as navigable waters could, in fact,
state regulation be permitted if such regulation imposed a direct burden upon
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227
(1859). Compare Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
Consider, for example, the power to regulate. "The commerce clause of the Constitution, of its own force, restrains the states from imposing direct burdens upon
interstate commerce." Id. at 307.
42. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
43. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 9 N.M. 292, 51 Pac. 674
(1898).
44. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
45. "Obviously the Rio Grande within the limits of New Mexico is not a
stream over which in its ordinary condition trade and travel can be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Its use for any purposes of
transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in times of temporary high
water." Id. at 699.
46. "The creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to
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affect the navigable capacity of any waters. The apparent wording of
the statute did not include nonnavigable waters since the Government
did not have jurisdiction over them in the year of the statutes enactment. The Supreme Court of New Mexico had interpreted the wording of the statute to exclude nonnavigable control, and since it was
clearly established that the portion of the Rio Grande running
through the territory of New Mexico was nonnavigable, the New
Mexico court felt that those waters were without the jurisdictional
limits of the United States. As there was no express declaration, it
could not be assumed, so the court said: 47
Congress intended to strike down and destroy the most important resource of this vast region, in order to promote the insignificant and questionable benefit of the navigation of the Rio
Grande for a short distance above its mouth; for the construction contended for does not limit the prohibition of the act of
Congress to the works proposed by the defendant.

.

.

. If

defendant's dam, at a point where the river is not navigable, is
an obstruction to the navigable capacity of the river several
hundred miles below, the same must be said of every dam and
irrigation ditch which diverts water from the river or any of its
confluents to their primary sources.
The United States Supreme Court had little difficulty in dismissing
this argument. The Court simply interpreted the statute4" as a prohibition against states or private parties obstructing navigable streams.
The statute prohibited all obstructions whether they occur on a
navigable stream or a nonnavigable stream or tributary if it can be
shown that they in any way impede the navigable capacity of a
stream. Such obstructions would be, at the Government's insistence,
removed.
Governmental authority under the commerce clause, had expanded to cover situations occurring on nonnavigable streams as
well as similar situations occurring on navigable streams. The Court,
in effect, granted to the federal government the power to remove
obstructions from nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams as a
means of maintaining the navigable capacity of the principal arteries
of water commerce.
the navigable capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United States has jurisdiction, is hereby prohibited. The continuance of any such obstruction, except
bridges, piers, docks and wharves, and similar structures erected for business
purposes, whether heretofore or hereafter created, shall constitute an offense.
." Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, §10, 26 Stat. 454.
47. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., supra note 43, at 307, 51
Pac. at 679.
48. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, §10, 26 Stat. 454.
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Limitations Upon State and PrivateWater Rights
In Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States49 the Court
took the next step in expanding federal power under the commerce
clause when it permitted the national government to order the removal or modification of artificial obstructions on a river that although
at the time nonnavigable, was navigable in its "natural state: A river
having navigable capacity in its beginning, then, can never lose the
label of navigability, according to the Court, even though the river
subsequently becomes nonnavigable.5 0
In United States v. Holt State Bank,51 Mr. Justice Van Devanter
attempted to explain how the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase
"navigable in fact." Streams or lakes are "navigable in fact," stated
Van Devanter:

52

when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which
such use is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing
vessels, or flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional difficulties
in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream
in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.
With the law of riparian rights on navigable waters firmly imbued
in the reports, a new era was beginning in the area of water use.
The Court was called upon to re-examine federal rights to streams
and watercourses. The result was that the Government assumed
almost unlimited jurisdiction over all waters, provided it could be
shown that federal interest in navigation was affected. 53 United
States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co. 54 made it clear that
riparian rights of individuals, if they in any way limited federal control, were extinguished. Mr. Justice Burton was, however, willing to
49. 256 u.s. 113 (1921). For a comprehensive study of many of the problems
posed in Economy Light & Power Co., see Starr, Navigable Waters of the United

States and National Control, 35 -LHnv. L. REv. 154 (1921).
50. See Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 Fed. 792, 796-99
(7th Cir. 1919).
51. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
52. Id. at 56.
53. See Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 Bur7ALo L.
R]v. 899, 492 (1961). Dean Trelease credits the federal government with almost
unlimited jurisdiction over all water in the United States.
54. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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concede that quite possibly some rights might exist in the waters of a
private, nonnavigable stream wholly upon the lands of one person. 55
Extension of Federal Authority Into Nonnavigable Streams
The formulation of a federal water policy under the commerce
clause has been an example of the "living Constitution" in action. As
the nation changed from an agrarian to an industrial economy, so the
Government was forced to change its water law. The Court has recognized the problems and interpreted the commerce clause to meet
the challenge. In so doing, the Court has had to expand by implication the actual wording of the commerce clause. The framers would
undoubtedly have difficulty in recognizing their work. 50
In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & IrrigationCo.5" the Court
recognized the Government's right to the use and control of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States as only a part of
the rights granted under the commerce clause. Until 1899, the Government's use and control of navigable streams had been the major
manifestation of federal control. However, the Court was to depart
from traditional control over navigable waters only and extend federal
jurisdiction into nonnavigable waters. The reasoning seemed to be
that in order for the federal government to preserve navigability, it
must have the power to take all measures necessary for such preser58
vation.
55. Id. at 69. But any right by an individual that might be asserted upon the
waters of a navigable stream would definitely be "subordinate to the right of
navigation, and subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation ...... Id. at 70. See also HuTcHINs, Sr.ua-rma PnouLmrs IN THE LAw OF WATER Rlxc'rs rN THE WsT 35 (U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942).
56. The Court, in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899), intimated that the portion of the Rio Grande in question was not, at
that time, navigable; yet, they would not admit having taken proprietary rights
from riparian owners on a stream nonnavigable both in fact and in law. The
indication was that federal control over navigable waters would extend to the
tributaries of the navigable waters; the question of the point concerning the
navigability of the tributaries would come later.

57. Ibid.
58. Id. at 708. The Court does not use direct authority to support this assertion, it rather relies upon several cases that do not, in fact, support the doctrine
of federal control over nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams. In Wilson
v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251 (1829) Chief Justice
Marshall held that states may construct upon navigable streams provided their
work upon the navigable streams does not "come into collision with the powers of
the general government." (Black Bird Creek was navigable in fact.) Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 WalL) 713 (1865), relying upon Gibbons and Wilson,
held that the power to regulate commerce comprehended the control over all
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By 1900 the early definition of navigable waters-navigable in
fact-had been extended; federal jurisdiction over nonnavigable tributaries had become almost absolute. So long as the preservation of
navigation appeared to be the congressional intent, expressed or implied, the Court seemed to strain to permit federal control to extend
59
into areas heretofore not intended.
Second Test of Navigability
From 1900 to 1940, the Government moved rapidly into areas of
flood control, hydro-electric power projects, reclamation, and navigation improvements. This gave the Court many significant problems
with which to work. Although several decisions cited, in passing, Rio
Grande Irrigation,60 it was not until 1940 that the decision was used
extensively. The case before the Court was United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,"' wherein the Court had to decide
whether to grant the Government the power to license obstructions
upon a river determined nonnavigable when the traditional test for
navigability was applied. First, the Court had to decide whether to
depart from that traditional test. A departure could bring almost all
watercourses within the realm of federal regulation under the
commerce clause. The Court decided to abandon the traditional test,
and this decision, coupled with Rio Grande Irrigation,indicated that
little was left that was not subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause. 2
Under the new test of navigability, a stream's potential availability for navigation must be considered6 3 Control is not limited to navigation, but extends to the federal government's utilizing all waterways in the best interest of the nation." The important feature of
navigable waters of the United States. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. (17
Otto) 678 (1882) dealt with navigable waters. The Chicago River and its navigable branches provide the basis for the same principle established in Gilman
and Wilson. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888) seemed to
follow the same line of reasoning previously discussed in these cases, and relying
upon these cases, did not consider the problem as it might affect a nonnavigable
tributary of a navigable stream.
59. Compare Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism? 36 ORE. L.
Blv. 221 (1957).
60. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Gutierres
v. Albuquerque Land & Irr. Co., 188 U.S. 545 (1903).
61. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
62. LAvER, THE EiPA Ax BicHT As PRoPERTY IN WATER REsouRcs AND THE
LAw 237-38 (1958); Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water
Law, 5 K~x. L. B-v. 626, 632-40 (1957).
63. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 877, 405, 409
(1940).
64. Id. at 407.
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the Appalachian Electric Power case, as applied here, seems to be
that the Appalachian Power Company applied to the Federal Power
Commission for a ruling as to the navigability of the New River. If
the river had been navigable, the power company would then have
been forced to obtain a federal license for the construction of a dam.05
The commission did tender a license to the power company. The
company, in turn, refused to accept it. The company proceeded,
under the sanction of the state of Virginia, to construct a dam along
the New River. Both the district court and the court of appeals
found the New River nonnavigable and refused to grant an injunction
to restrain the construction. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring
the New River to be navigable. Mr. Justice Roberts argued that the
test for navigability established in this case would be met by nearly
every stream in the country.6" With proper expenditure of funds, he
stated, just about every stream could be made navigable. Although
the AppalachianElectric Power case as precedent stands for more than
merely a new concept of navigability,67 for our purposes its significance
lies in the unique test established for navigability.
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, never satisfactorily
answered the respondents contention that each determination of
navigability must stand on its own facts, and that the factual findings
concurred in by both the district court and the circuit court should be
accepted by the Supreme Court "unless clear error is shown."6 8 Justice
Reed felt that no single test should be applied to determine navigability, but that navigability should remain a question of fact. 9 If
the river could be made navigable by improvements, even though
there had been long periods of disuse, the Court would then look to
65. 49 Stat. 846 (1935), 16 U.S.C.A. §817 (1962).
66. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 434 (1940).
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
67. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co. had extended federal jurisdiction over nonnavigable waters in order to protect navigability; however, the basic
constitutional test of navigability was retained and not drastically altered in any
way. See Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-StateRelationship,
48 CAL.n L. REv. 43 (1960).
68. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 66, at 377, 386,
403. The only answer the Court could make to respondents contention was that in
dealing "with issues such as these before us, facts and their constitutional significance are too closely connected to make the two-court rule a serviceable guide."
Id. at 404.
69. For an earlier case supporting this view, see Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423 (1931). For a recent discussion of governmental rights to regulate and
to control navigation see United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.
624, 627-28 (1961). See also Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d 91, 96 (4th Cir.
1961).
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the intent of Congress for the justification for improvements to non7°
navigable waters that would make them navigable.
After this decision, if Congress deemed improvements necessary
to make any stream or watercourse navigable, the Court would not
look behind the Act of Congress for a more realistic determination of
navigability. 71 It would simply bring the stream in question under the
control of the federal government, state or private rights to nonnavigable streams to the contrary notwithstanding. Following this decision,
any river is navigable if it is capable of being made so by improvements. Any stream is therefore "navigable in fact" if subsequent improvements would render it useful for purposes of navigation.72
Federal power over navigable streams was no longer limited to a control of navigation, but included regulation of commerce on the
streams, navigation being but a segment of commerce. Such control
also includes the right to regulate power development and subject all
waters, navigable and those that might be made so by "improvements;' to "national planning and control."
The decision in Rio Grande Irrigation was reaffirmed when the
Court, in Oklahoma v. Atkinson,73 permitted general federal water control, including hydro-electric power production, to extend into nonnavigable waters.
In Atkinson the state of Oklahoma sought to enjoin the building
of the Denison Dam. The project contemplated the dual role of
flood control and hydro-electric power production.7 4 The main complaint of the state of Oklahoma was not so much against the flood
control aspect as it was against the power development. The dam
when completed would flood a vast area of land, most of which was
in Oklahoma. Included in the flooded area would be highways and
school districts. There was also a strong possibility that the flooding
would cut off access to valuable mineral resources. The Court held
that since flood control and stream flow regulation were within the
constitutional powers of the Congress, the Court should not inquire
75
further into the motives of Congress.
70. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 66, at 377.
71. Ibid. This, of course, is standard procedure with regard to judicial interpretation of legislative enactments; however, it could stand some modification in

the water law area.
72. The Court did not attempt to determine who would decide what were
reasonable improvements, nor did it suggest any criterion upon which reasonable
cost could be balanced against extraordinary improvements. Id. at 438.
73. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
74. The authorization by Congress for the project in question can be found in
52 Stat. 1215 (1938).
75. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 318 U.S. 508, 529 (1941). Another interesting
aspect of this case is that the area of the Red River where the dam was built is
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Using artificial reasoning to determine navigability, the Court held
that federal power under the commerce clause includes regulation
and control of the waters of a nonnavigable tributary so long as it
will serve the interests of navigation on navigable streams. All other
incidental purposes would also be permitted since the Court would
not look behind the apparent intent of Congress to discover the real
purpose of the dam. 76
The effect of Atkinson and Appalachian Power Co., coupled with
the earlier decisions, beginning with Rio Grande Irrigation,was that
by 1941 the federal government, under its commerce power, could
virtually control waters on all navigable as well as nonnavigable
streams. Congress, in effect, was given the power to develop resources for any purpose deemed fit. The mere fact that a stream is
nonnavigable, or that the primary purpose of a particular project is
power development rather than navigation, carries little weight. If
it can be shown that the stream could be made navigable by reasonable improvements, that the Congress intended some benefit, no matter how small, to commerce, or that projects along a nonnavigable
tributary of a navigable stream in some way aided navigation, congressional power is upheld. Flood control and waterway development
have been recognized as having equal importance with the maintenance of navigation as constitutional objectives of Congress.77 In the
consideration of the commerce clause as construed in these cases, it is
apparent that if the federal government wanted to act, it could bring
practically all state water resources
under its control to the complete
78
exclusion of state and local use.
Dominant Federal Servitude Along Navigable
Streams and Watercourses
The Courts have consistently granted to the federal government
the power to regulate and improve navigable waters, thus creating
nonnavigable with very little hope of improvement for navigability. Id. at 515.
76. Id. at 529.
77. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S., 53 (1913); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co.,

174 U.S. 690 (1899).
78. See generally Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water
Law, 5 KAN. L. REV. 626 (1957); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the
Federal-StateRelationship, 48 CAIa1. L. Rnv. 43 (1960); Scott, Is Federal Control of Water Power Development Incompatible With State Interests?, 9 GFo.
WAsH. L. REV. 631 (1941); Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law,
10 BurrALo L. REv. 399 (1961).
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a dominant servitude in favor of the federal government

79

In exer-

cising its power, the Government is not held responsible for any damage caused to private property as a direct result of the regulation and
improvement of navigable waters. This doctrine applies only when
the injured riparian is also situated on the particular stream involved
in the improvement.80 The Court has apparently drawn a fine distinction worth noting. Where the Government incidentally invades
riparian rights on a nonnavigable tributary while exercising its dominant servitude over navigable waters, compensation might be
81
awarded.
The United States v. Cress8 2 decision attempted to limit the well
settled doctrine of federal superiority in navigable waters by considering the meaning of "navigable streams" within the general federal
dominant servitude rule.83 The Court, it seems, will consider granting
compensation to a riparian owner where the owner can show that
although the Government was exercising its lawful dominant servitude in furtherance of commerce on a navigable stream, it did unintentionally and directly cause damage to the plaintiff's property rights
on a nonnavigable tributary. It must be shown that the nonnavigable
tributary did not in any way fit into the federal plan for the regulation
79. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 272 (1897): "Riparian
ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the government in that
regard. The legislative authority for these works consisted simply in an appropriation for their construction, but this was an assertion of a right belonging to the
government, to which riparian property was subject, and not of a right to appropriate private property, not burdened with such servitude, to public purposes."
Id. at 276. See also Srmu, Azmuc"._ WATER RnsotRcs ADrmnnsTEA To 100
(1956); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship,
supra note 78, at 48, 46.
80. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
Here the question, as framed by Justice Roberts, was whether the federal government should be required to pay compensation to a riparian owner for injury
caused to structures that were located between the high and low water marks,
where it is clearly shown that the damage was the direct result of the raising of
the water level in the navigable stream for the improvement of navigation. The
fact that both parties to the litigation were confined to the navigable stream made
the holding of the Court reasonable. Another question that the Court was called
upon to decide, was whether the decision would be the same if the Government
action were on a nonnavigable stream. This idea will be developed further. See
Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulations, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 332
(1961); Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALo L. REv.
399 (1961).
81. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
82. Ibid.
83. Id. at 321, 323.
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and improvement of the particular navigable stream.8 4 The language
in Cress has since been confined to the facts in the Cress case, and has
not been expanded by later courts into a general policy of law."5 If
Cress were to be expanded, or at least relied upon, in later similar
factual situations, the federal dominant servitude would prove to be
a costly right.
In United States v. Willow River Power Co.8 6 the Court was called
upon to determine the rights of a riparian owner to the flow of a
navigable stream, and further, whether the same rights were affected
on its nonnavigable tributary. The Court first disposed of the question
whether the Cress test was controlling by distinguishing the two
cases on their facts. Cress, said the majority, could be relied upon
only if the level of a nonnavigable tributary were affected. The instant case involved the raising of the level of a navigable stream. 7
The disposal of the Cress decision facilitated the Court's holding that
the Government was not liable where the level of a navigable river
was raised in the exercise of dominant servitude over navigable
waters. Thus, any resulting loss of water power to the riparian
owner's hydro-electric plant located on a nonnavigable tributary could
not be claimed as a valid taking. The decision was that the taking
was not compensable. 88
84. Compare United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) and United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) with United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,

363 U.S. 229 (1960), United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945), and United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233
(1960); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United

States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
86. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
87. Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, was unable to distinguish the two cases.
He thought that the level of the nonnavigable stream was also raised. He further
stated, in effect, that the majority should either have applied Cress correctly, or
overruled it, since they had so palpably disregarded it. Id. at 514-15 (Stone,
C. J., and Roberts, J., dissenting).
88. "[T]he government has not interfered with any natural flow of the [nonnavigable] Willow past claimant's lands. Where it was riparian owner along Willow's natural channel claimant already has created an artificial level much above
the Government level. If claimant's land along the Willow was at all affected, it
was at the point where the land was riparian to the artificial channel, just back
of the shore line of the [navigable] St. Croix, where the land had been cut away to
install the dam and power plant and to utilize the advantages of being riparian to
the St. Croix. We think the claimant's maximum and only interest in the level of
the St. Croix arises from its riparian position thereon and is not helped by the fact
that its utilization of riparian lands on the St. Croix involves conducting over them
at artificial levels waters from the Willow." Id. at 503-04. The plant in question
was located on the Willow near the confluence of the navigable and nonnavigable
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The conclusion to be drawn at this point is that the Court has
made it clear that when Congress expressly exercises its power over
a navigable stream and appropriates the flow of the stream, there will
be no compensable rights against the Government for the loss of the
water to a riparian owner.8 9 Riparian owners on a nonnavigable
stream present a more difficult problem. However, the problem is not
so difficult that the result could not in the future be the same. 90
In 1950, the ghost of Cress reappeared in United States v. Kansas
City Life Insurance Co.91 to haunt Mr. Justice Douglas. He vainly
attempted to establish a workable doctrine whereby both navigable and
nonnavigable riparian owners would be treated equally when faced
with a loss of water or the use thereof.9 2 The question arose when
an owner of land situated on a nonnavigable tributary of the Mississippi River sued the federal government for damages caused when
the Government constructed a dam on the river. The dam raised the
water level of the river to the ordinary high water mark. This resulted in underflowing waters and improper drainage, which in turn
raised the water level of the nonnavigable tributary and thus caused
a rapid depreciation in the agricultural value of the owner's land. The
Court in a five-to-four decision felt that the depreciation in value
caused by underflowing waters and improper drainage was sufficient
to constitute a taking of private property under the fifth amendment. 93
streams. The powerhouse was located on the land above the ordinary high water
mark of the St. Croix. Id. at 500.
89. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
90. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 89, at 233;
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). But see United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
91. 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (5-to-4 decision).
92. Id. at 813-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissenters could not understand why nonnavigable riparian owners should be treated any differently than
navigable riparian owners, since Congress does have the power to regulate commerce by raising the level of a stream to its high water mark without liability for
compensation to any riparian owner. The effect upon the riparian owners, whether
on a navigable stream or its nonnavigable tributary, is the same; therefore, when

the courts speak in terms of no vested property right given to anyone as against

the public interest, they should logically include that the public interest in the
full utilization and control of rivers for navigation must extend federal immunity

into nonnavigable streams.
93. The majority resurrects Cress while the minority decides that it is time
to overrule Cress once and for all. Thus the dominant servitude of the federal
government to improve navigation does not extend beyond the bed of the stream
which is bounded by its natural banks, according to the majority in the instant
case. Compare Fitts & Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and Its
Agents for Injuries to Real Property Resulting From River Improvements, 10
TENN.L. 1Ev. 801, 817-19 (1941).
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The decision seems to have been predicated upon the fact that
the damage caused by the percolating waters occurred on land that
was located beyond the bed of the stream. 94 If this be the case then
the majority has in effect, placed the burden upon the Government
of including in their estimate of ultimate cost of a water project, all
probable indirect and unforeseen injuries to nonnavigable or navigable
riparian owners. 95
In the Kansas City case the Court allowed recovery. In United
States v. Twin City Power Co.9 the Justices again split five-to-four.
In this case Mr. Justice Douglas, the champion of the dissenters in
Kansas City, was able to convince a bare majority of the Court not
to extend the notion advanced by the majority in Kansas City. Mr.
Justice Burton, who wrote the majority opinion in the previous case,
delivered the dissent in Twin City. This case, although not extending or advocating a doctrine to apply to nonnavigable riparian owners,
was nevertheless an important step toward what might be termed a
more benevolent attitude of the Court in aiding the federal government in its program of power and navigation improvement.
In Twin City the United States brought condemnation proceedings
to acquire certain property on a navigable stream for the improve94. Mr. Justice Douglas objects to the reasoning of the majority and indicates
that the ordinary high water mark rule should apply to injured nonnavigable
rights: "It would be incongruous to deny compensation to owners adjacent to navigable rivers and require it for others bordering their tributaries for like injuries
caused by the single act of lifting the river's mean level to the high water mark.
Because water seeks its own level, raising the level of the river necessarily raises
that of the tributary at their conjunction and as far upstream on each as the
effects of the lifting may go. These facts are equally apparent to both types of
owners. We think they should be anticipated by both, and that the one has no
more power to obstruct or burden the power of Congress in its control of the
river's bed in the interest of navigation than the other. Neither has any greater
right to have the riverflow in its naturalstate than the other." (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 812 (1950) (dissenting).
95. Fitts & Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and Its Agents for
Injuries to Real Property Resulting From River Improvements, 16 TmNN. L. BRv.
801, 826-27 (1941). Here the authors indicate that to burden the federal government with claims for damages resulting from injuries other than those which can
be planned for, permanent backwater flooding of lands would render the costs of
necessary federal projects completely unpredictable and thus "operate as a practical prohibition of such improvements to navigable streams." Ibid. The authors
cite Coleman v. United States, 181 Fed. 599, 604 (N.D. Ala. 1910) wherein the
court held a "taking" under the fifth amendment to be a permanent flooding and
destruction of the value of the land. Id. Compare the language of Mr. Justice
Douglas speaking for the Court in United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,
363 U.S. 229 (1960).
96. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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ment of navigation and a power project.97 Compensation, based in
part upon the value of the land as a power site, was awarded to the
landowner. 98 The Supreme Court, five-to-four, held that the Government was not required to compensate landowners for the increase in
the value of riparian lands resulting from their suitability as a power
site. 99 Mr. Justice Douglas based a great deal of his argument
upon the holdings in United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power
Co.'0 0 The latter holding denied compensation to a riparian owner for
the value of his land as a site for water power development. The
reasoning was that since the owner had no property right in the
stream, nor any right to develop water power, he must bow to a
dominant federal servitude. As a result of the decision in Twin
City the federal government probably does not have to pay a riparian
owner any increment of value that might result from the flow of the
stream.101

Dominant Federal Servitude Along Nonnavigable Streams
The basic problem whether the navigable dominant servitude of
the federal government extends to nonnavigable waters still lurked in
the shadows. An affirmative holding would, in effect, pre-empt
97. As pointed out earlier, the United States will not be permitted to dam up
a navigable stream solely for power purposes, but if Congress indicates that part
of the project will be devoted to the "improvement of navigation" the Court will
not look behind Congressional language, even though they might, in fact, find the
"improvement of navigation" aspect of the project to be merely a thin veil to
cover the actual purpose of power development. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
98. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court combined the two cases.
99. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
100. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). Mr. Justice Burton also relied upon a portion of
Chandler-Dunbarthat was not discussed by the majority in the instant case. The
Court in Chandler-Dunbar,although holding that a riparian owner was not entitled to the value of his land as a site for water power development, nevertheless
permitted value for canal and lock purposes to be awarded to the riparian owner
along with his compensation for the riparian land. Id. at 75.
101. "If the owner of the fast lands can demand water-power value as part
of his compensation, he gets the value of a right that the Government in the
exercise of its dominant servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses. The right
has value or is an empty one dependent solely on the Government. What the
Government can grant or withhold and exploit for its own benefit has a value that
is peculiar to it and that no other user enjoys. . . . To require the United States
to pay for this water-power value would be to create private claims in the public
domain." United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 99, at 228. For a
criticism of the reasoning of Douglas see Comment, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 370, 37374 (1957).
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state or individual property rights in those waters affected, at least
when asserted against the federal government. The question was
brought out in the open momentarily by the Government in United
States v. Grand River Dam Authority.10 2 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, was not willing to come to grips with the Government's contention. 10 3 Does it make any difference whether the Court
directly answers the Government's contention, or has it in effect indirectly indicated that the Governments analysis is a correct one? Can
the federal government extend its dominant servitude into nonnavigable streams, denying compensation for invasion of riparian rights when
conflicting with federal power? 0 4
In Grand River the Authority had obtained a license under the
Federal Power Act' 0 5 to build and operate three dams on the Grand
River, a nonnavigable tributary of the Arkansas River. Congress had
incorporated the Authority's dam sites into a federal project as part of
an overall plan for regulation and improvement of navigation, flood
control, and production of hydro-electric power. The Authority was
denied compensation for the value of the water power and the state
franchise to develop electric power and energy. A unanimous Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, said that when Congress asserts
control over a nonnavigable stream as a necessity for the improvement
of navigation, riparian rights are subservient to those of the federal
government. The resulting financial interests in the flow of the
stream are not recoverable against the federal government. 00 Howto remain intact
ever, riparian rights along nonnavigable streams were
0'
government.'
federal
the
except
bodies
all
against
102. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
103. Id. at 232.
104. See generally Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75
HAnv. L. REv. 332, 337-42 (1961); Martz, The Role of the Federal Government
in State Water Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 626, 634-40 (1957); Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BurFrAo L. REv. 899, 407-10 (1961). "When the
United States appropriates the flow either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream
pursuant to its superior power under the commerce clause, it is exercising established prerogatives and is beholden to no one." Id. at 283. Does Douglas mean
that, as the government attorneys argued, the federal government does not have
to pay a riparian owner for his lost property right, or is it a valid "taking" under
the fifth amendment? Should compensation be allowed only where there has been
an actual forced removal of the riparian owner from his lands? See Coleman v.
United States, 181 Fed. 599 (N.D. Ala. 1910).
105. 49 Stat. 846 (1935), 16 U.S.C.A. §817 (1962).
106. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 102. See also
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Chicago, M., St.
P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
107. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 102; Oklahoma
v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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After Grand River, the position of the Court regarding the rights

of riparian owners along nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams
was confusing at best. The dominant servitude of the federal government could be exercised on nonnavigable waters without compensation for loss of water power when Congress specifically designated
those waters as necessary in the improvement of navigation. The
hazy area in which the Court seemed to fluctuate was in an attempt
to set forth a stable doctrine dealing with the problems arising when
there is interference with state created property rights in a nonnavigable stream and the interference is incidental to the project authorized by the Congress. 0 8 In such a case, should the federal government reimburse the nonnavigable riparian owner for his loss of water
power, dam site, or other incidental loss not considered a "taking"
under the fifth amendment? The holdings of the Court, although
seemingly clear in each specific case, never formulate a set standard
by which the federal government can act. 10 9 A study of the previous
decisions clearly demonstrates that the federal government has control over navigation. It follows, then, that the federal government
has control over navigable waters. Although the Court has been reluctant to call the federal right an absolute title, it has permitted
such terms as "dominant servitude" and "navigation servitude" to
which private property interests were subordinate. 1 0
108. Compare United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) with United
States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941) and United States
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). See also Munro, The Pelton
Decision: A New Riparianism?,36 ORE. L. REv. 221 (1957).
109. "Basically the problem ... is to locate a workable and reasonable
boundary between Congress' power to control navigation in the public interest
and the rights of landowners adjacent to navigable streams and their tributaries
to compensation for injuries flowing from the exercise of that power. The Constitution does not require compensation for all injuries inflicted by the exercise of
Congress' power. Neither is the power unlimited. The line therefore must be
drawn in accommodation of the two interests....
"There is no sound reason for treating the two types of owners differently.
Congress has power to regulate commerce by raising the level of a navigable
stream to high-water mark without liability for compensation to any riparian
owner. The effect upon the riparian owner of the river's tributaries, whether
navigable or nonnavigable, is the same as that upon the owner riparian to the
river itself. So is the congressional power and the dominant servitude. In this
view no vested private right is given to anyone, as against the public interest, in the
full utilization and control of the river's bed for navigation or in the flow of the
stream within it. If Congress acts beyond this limit then the Amendment will
come into play to protect the landowners interest." United States v. Kansas City
Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 813 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.
53 (1913); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Gibson v. United States,
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Pumpelly v. Green Bay Canal Co.1 11 set one of the first constitu-

tional limitations upon the Government's superior right. Again in
United States v. Lynah"1 2 the Court found an implied intent to take
property under the fifth amendment. This result was occasioned by
damage to lands belonging to a riparian owner along the navigable
river by the Government in its lawful exercise of its superior right.
Even after United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
R.R. 113 had in effect overruled Lynah and limited Cress to cases
wherein the damage had occurred beyond the ordinary high water
mark, the Court was still unclear as to when the federal government
should pay compensation for a "taldng" of property while exercising
its supremacy.
Having extended the navigable servitude doctrine to nonnavigable
streams, the Court was again faced with the problem of determining
a tadng in Kansas City Life Insurance, but could not reach a satis-

166 U.S. 269 (1897). In exercising its "dominant servitude" the federal government is immune from liability for destruction of property situated in the bed of
the navigable stream below the ordinary high water mark. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
111. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). Here the Court found that when the
Government caused an overflow of riparian land by flooding, above the ordinary
water level, such destruction was compensable.
112. 188 U.S. 445 (1903). Lynah was not destined to become a landmark
decision in this area of water rights, and the Court would not, generally, follow it
in analogous situations; finally in United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R.,
312 U.S. 592 (1941) Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, sounded the
death knell to this aspect of Lynah when he said: "We are bound, therefore, to
determine whether we shall follow that decision [Lynah] in respect of the issue
involved in the instant case. [The question bothering Justice Roberts was whether
in following Lynah and Cress, the federal government should be made to compensate a riparian owner for injury to structures located between the high and
low water marks where the damage to the riparian was caused as a result of the
raising of the water level in the navigable stream for the improvement of navigation.] The decision was by a divided court; and later, in a similar case, there was
an affirmance by an equally divided court. The case has often been cited as
authority for the settled doctrine that an authorized taking of property for public
use gives rise to an implied promise to pay just compensation. But we think this
Court has never followed it as a binding decision that compensation is due for
injury or destruction of a riparian ovner's property located in the bed of a navigable stream. And we think that, so far as it sanctions such a principle, it is an
irreconcilable conflict with our later decisions and cannot be considered as expressing the law." Id. at 598 (citations omitted). So in effect, Chicago, M., St.
P. & Pae. R.R. overruled Lynah and limited Cress.
113. 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
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factory result." 4 After the struggle in Twin City Power,"8 the
Court seemed to be at the point at which it could agree that, since
the federal government has the power over navigable streams, it
should not be required to pay any riparian owner any increment in
value that might be due to the flow of the stream. The Court did
indicate that compensation for 6such resulting loss was within the
discretion of the Government."
LmrrrAnoNs UPON FEDERAL "TAKLNG"

The Justices seemed to have resolved their differences, when, in
1960, the Court reaffirmed the extension of the dominant servitude
rule and held it applicable to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
streams. The Court did stress, however, that the servitude must be
exercised with specific reference to such stream or watercourse. Thus
occurred the reaffirmation of the extension of the "navigation fiction"
to include circumstances wherein the Government feels it necessary
to assert its superior power over a nonnavigable tributary of a navi7
gable stream."1
When the facts in a case varied slightly, the Court was again split
as to what constituted a "taking" sufficient to justify compensation
when it was not specified in the fifth amendment and when, for example, a flowage easement was involved instead of a right to water
power. This was the case in United States v. VirginiaElectric& Power
Co." 8 In 1944, the federal government began the construction of a
dam and reservoir on the Roanoke River. The Government had obtained title to the tract in question for one dollar. The Virginia Electric
and Power Company had a perpetual and exclusive flowage easement
over a portion of the tract which was within the easement taken by
the Government. This easement also entitled the Virginia Power
Company to flood their portion of the tract. In the condemnation
proceedings against the power company's easement, the company
claimed full value of the property as a reservoir bed. Before a final
determination of the matter could be reached, the Supreme Court
114. In a 5-to-4 opinion the majority in effect resurrected Cress, see Comment,
18 U. Cur. L. REv. 355 (1951); while the dissenters pleaded in vain to treat riparian owners alike, whether they be on the navigable stream being subjected to
the dominant servitude of the federal government or its nonnavigable tributary.
115. Again a 5-to-4 decision, but this time the dissenters were able to convince Mr. Justice Clark of their position. They lost Justice Minton, but gained,
new to the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren. Mr. Justice Harlan took Mr. Justice
Jackson's place among the dissenters in Twin City Power.
116. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956).
117. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 863 U.S. 229 (1960).
118. 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (6-to-B decision).
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decided the Twin City case. After this decision they vacated and
remanded Virginia Electric for further consideration in view of Twin
City.119 This time the lower court made the award to cover only the
tract value for agricultural, forestry, and grazing purposes.120 The Supreme Court felt that just compensation had to be awarded for the
easement although the case was remanded for a redetermination of
the amount of the recovery. 121 The majority strained to permit an
award. They agreed with the dissenters that there should be no compensation for the easement if it was derived solely from the availability of the flow of water for power purposes.1 22 However, they found
that the value of the easement was not attributable to the flow of the
stream, but to the depreciative impact of the easement upon the nonriparian uses of the land.
The Court accepted the argument by the power company that
their easement had value other than that which was dependent upon
the flow of the stream. It was necessary to find some other value in
order to place the case within the Kansas City Life Insurance Co.
rule,123 which would then require the Government to compensate for
the loss. Those dissenting questioned the value of the easement to the
power company at the time the Government acquired it.' 24 The majority said, however, that it was of sufficient value, since it could be
shown that the power company had the right to destroy agricultural,
timber, and grazing uses, thus creating in the company a valuable
property right. Since the Court was able to show to its satisfaction
that the company had, in losing its flowage easement, lost the interest
119. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 350 U.S. 956 (1956),
vacating and remanding, United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 218 F.2d 524
(4th Cir. 1955).
120. United States v. 2979.72 Acres of Land, 270 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1959).
121. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961). The
majority found that the lower court was correct in confining its award to the
maximum nonriparian value in question.
122. The Government would agree with the Court that a flowage easement is
"property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. However, there can be
no compensation paid to the power company as a result of the destruction of the
easement because, the Government argues, the easement was subject to the overriding navigational servitude of the United States. Id. at 627. See also United
States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941).
123. See text at note 91 supra.
124. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., supra note 121, at 643
(dissent). See generally United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U.S. 53 (1913); Hutchins, The Common-Law Riparian Doctrine in Oregon:
Legislative and Judicial Modification, 36 OnE. L. REv. 193 (1957); Martz, The
Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN.L. BRv. 626, 634-40

(1957); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship,
48 CALwn. L. REv. 43,46-47 (1960).
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that entitled it to flood the subservient land and use it as a reservoir,
the decision was that the Government had to compensate for the loss.
In answer to this, the dissenters demonstrated that the only right to
"destroy" agricultural uses consisted solely in the company's right to
125
dam and back the river's waters upon them:
and when the government determined to construct the dam
for its own benefit, even that nebulous "right" was gone.
Hence, the easement had no possible value . . . to the power
company at the time the government took it.
If the dissenting analysis was correct, then the Government should
not be made to pay for a loss of a "theoretical creation" suffered by no
one in fact. 26 The Court was also faced with the dilemma-should
compensation also be denied the owner of the easement because at
the time of the condemnation it was valueless in the hands of the
company. The majority neatly maneuvered around this dilemma,
and, as earlier stated, found a way to compensate the power com27
pany.'
Whether the majority correctly analyzed the problem according
to previous decisions, or whether, in fact, the dissent had set the
pattern for future expansion of Government prerogatives over all
streams and watercourses without the disability of the fifth amendment, are questions that have not yet been settled. Enlightenment is
needed in order to afford the federal government greater mobility in
developing a natural resource that the states have either been unwilling or incapable of developing. The majority was not willing to expand to any degree the wording in Grand River Dam that could have
been used, along with Twin City and Chandler-Dunbar,in order to
produce the result advocated in the dissenting opinion.
Present Status of Limitations as Effectuated by the Supreme Court
After Virginia Electric, where has the Supreme Court placed
the riparian owner in relation to federal projects on navigable and
125. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., supra note 121, at 640

(dissent).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.

53 (1913).
127. The dissenters maintained that the Government does not owe compensation for any thing so far as the power company is concerned. The easement could
only be of value if the owner could build a dam and back up the water, but
once the Government began its project the possibility no longer existed for the
owner. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., supra note 121, at 644-45
(dissent).
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nonnavigable streams? 128 Can the federal government now be assured
of certain rights which they might exert in exercising their dominant
servitude? Do riparian or prospective riparian owners now know
what rights in the flow of water and in their riparian lands they can
profitably assert against the Government when the latter is attempting to exercise its dominant servitude? These are questions that
the Supreme Court cannot avoid.
Many of these questions have been answered by the Court, although somewhat unsatisfactorily. Riparian rights, whether along
navigable or nonnavigable streams are still a puzzling lot when compensation is involved. A brief review of some of the Court's activities
in this area, other than those previously discussed, reveals certain
logical inconsistencies. For example, must the Government compensate a riparian owner for injury caused to structures located on a navigable stream when the damage results from the raising of the water
level for the improvement of navigation? The Court in United States
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. 12 9 would not permit
such compensation; yet, if this same problem had occurred on a nonnavigable stream, the Court would probably have allowed compensation. 130 The rationale in the first case seems to be that the riparian
rights affected were not substantial enough to afford any constitutional protection if the injury occurred upon a navigable stream.: 3' In
the second example, the Court would hold that since the right was
purely nominal and occurring along a nonnavigable stream, compensation should be permitted. 32 If the damages were considered "con128. Although basic to this discussion, it might be well to reiterate the nature
of the possible conflicts that might arise. Generally, conflicts between public
and private rights stem from either activities of a riparian owner when he is
knowingly or unknowingly interfering with the public use of the stream or watercourse for navigation or any other aspect of the federal "dominant servitude."
And of course, the reverse would also be true if the federal government interferes with the basic rights of a riparian owner in the navigable or nonnavigable
stream or watercourse, i.e.: his right to the water or bed of the stream. For
examples see: United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592
(1941); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913); Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
U.S. 141 (1900). For an expanded discussion of this problem see Pitts & Marquis,
Liability of the Federal Government and Its Agents for Injuries to Real Property
Resulting From River Improvements, 16 TENN. L. REv. 801 (1941).
129. 312 U.S. 592 (1941). Governmental power over navigation will cover
the entire bed of a navigable stream including all lands located below the ordinary water mark. Id. at 596.
130. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
131. See also United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
132. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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sequential" probably no compensation would have been allowed.133
However, "consequential" damages are included in awards under
the law of eminent domain. 13 4
Under the Government's paramount right to the bed of navigable
waters comes the power to establish harbor lines thereon. These lines
limit state and private structures to within the established area.135
Furthermore, if the federal government should decide to alter the
harbor lines so that state and private structures formerly within the
limits are excluded, it is proper for it to do so. Any structures outside
the altered line may be removed if the Government determines that
these structures are obstructions. 130 Rights in navigable waters, the
submerged bed, and the shore below the high water mark are only
dominant servitude. Thus in
recognized subject to the federal 137
Scranton v. Wheeler the Court said:
Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the
submerged lands in front of his upland bordering on a public
navigable water, his title is not as full and complete as his title
to fast land which has no direct connection with the navigation
of such water. It is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not
at his absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all
times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of
the waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or
demanded by the public right of navigation.
As to these lands, there will be no compensation so long as the Government does not actually injure or physically take. Any financial
13 8
hardship to the riparian owner must be borne by 'him alone.
A riparian's access to navigable waters may also be destroyed with133. In Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904), the Government
erected revetments along the banks of the Mississippi River to prevent erosion;
the improvements caused severe damage to the riparian proprietor's land; the
Court, relying upon Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) and United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), found that the damage was merely consequential and therefore did not require compensation by the Government for

the loss.
134. United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 82 F.2d 131, 185 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 689 (1936).
185. Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916).
136. Ibid.
187. 179 U.S. 141 (1900).

188. In Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) the destruction of oyster beds used by the riparian proprietor for oyster cultivation
coming as a result of the deepening of the channel in the interest of navigation,

was not a "taking" of property sufficient to permit compensation.
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss3/2

See also Union

32

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XV1

Baldwin: The Impact of the Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights Doctrine

out the Government's compensating for the loss. 139 In United States
v. Commodore Park, Inc. 40 the Government, while improving the
navigable capacity of an already navigable bay, sealed off the mouth of
Mason Creek, a navigable arm of the bay. As a result, riparian owners
living along the creek were denied access to the bay. The Court did
not find a "taking" sufficient to permit compensation. Futhermore,
the Court stated that the Government had the power to block navigation at one place in order to foster it at another. Under such circumstances no compensation would be allowed. 141 If the right of
access had been prevented or hindered by piers constructed in the
furtherance of navigation, compensation would also have been
42
denied.1
When federal dams alter the natural flow of streams, thus causing
injury to riparian proprietors' embankments, no compensation is permitted if it can be shown that the injury occurred along the ordinary
high water mark. 1 43 The Court has determined that when the
Government is building dams, it is not required to pay, while taking
land for dam sites, for the possible value of the particular location for
a dam site.' 4 4 When land is flooded as a result of federal navigational
improvement, the distinction is made between the damage directly
resulting from the act of the Government and that which is the indirect result and, therefore, an act of nature. If the Court finds the
latter to be the case, the Government is relieved of paying any compensation. 145
When it comes to payment for damage on navigable waters, the
Government can indeed be frugal. Generally the Court permits this
tight-fistedness where the flow of the water, the water itself, or access
thereto is involved. The Court has indicated that if Congress so desired, it could abolish all private rights in navigable streams.' 40 Nonnavigable streams could very easily be included within the same
classification and controlled as navigable waters under the commerce
clause. The Court is, in effect, the ultimate water law agency. It
is prepared to handle and clarify federal water rights. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that by continuing in the present direction, the
189. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
140. 824 U.S. 886 (1945).
141. Scranton v. Wheeler, supra note 189.
142. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., supra note 140, at 898.
143. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 812 U.S. 592 (1941).
144. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
145. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904).
146. Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 847 U.S.
289 (1954); Schwartz, Niagara Mohawk v. F.P.C.: Have Private Water Rights
Been Destroyed by the Federal Power Act?, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 81 (1958).
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distinctions between navigable and nonnavigable streams will be practically eliminated, especially where the national interest is directly
involved. Some scholars have suggested that such decisions should
be left to administrative agencies that have sufficient expertise to
balance the competing policy factors involved. 147 As the situation
stands, many of the contested federal encroachments will come to
rest before the Supreme Court as final "agency" for determination.
It is the Supreme Court that will, as it has in the past, expand or hold
firm in the interpretation of the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court has apparently adopted certain standards to
differentiate between rights along navigable streams and rights along
nonnavigable streams. In light of the expansion of the commerce
clause to cover nonnavigable waters, the standards would appear
purely academic. The water conflict is a dilemma that involves some
of the most basic ideas of states' rights as opposed to national interests.' 48 The complex aspects of federalism are starkly presented in the
area of water resources.
SUMMARY

The present position of the Court has been of little help in discerning the actual rights of riparian owners when challenged by the
legislative demands of the Government. Some facts worth summarizing emerge from the previous analysis of the Supreme Court's
treatment of federal projects affecting riparian rights. It appears that
whatever the reaction may be to the expanding interpretation of the
commerce clause by the Supreme Court, it is a "fact of life."1 49 These
147. One author suggests that a federal regulatory agency be established
with authority to, in effect, control water resources with a licensing power; granting permits to private developers, states, local communities, or any combination
of public and private groups, but with the prime objective promoting the best
interests of the nation as a whole. Forer, Water Supply: Suggested FederalRegulation, 75 HArtv. L. Ruv. 832, 347-49 (1961). Persons commenting on the subject
generally agree that something in the way of legislation should be done to help
relieve the acute problems forced upon the Supreme Court. Ellis, Some Current
and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IowA L. RBu.
237, 259 (1956); Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State
Relationship, 48 CAI.IF. L. REv. 48, 53-57 (1960); Trelease, Federal Limitations
on State Water Law, 10 Bu-rALo L. REv. 399, 424-26 (1961).
148. CoRwim, THE TwniLGHT OF =E SuPn.su CouRT 19-20 (1934).
149. The argument will rage on as to the role of the United States Supreme
Court when interpreting the Constitution. For example see Suprazm CoURT Am
SupmiEM LAw (Calm ed. 1954): "Culminating the great achievements of the
Constitutional Period (the era of Marbury v. Madison), it accomplished the
transition from perpetuity to efficacy, from immutability to adaption, and from
heavenly to judicial sanctions. Finally, it introduced an unending colloquy be-

tween the Supreme Court and the people of the United States, in which the
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facts must be recognized, especially in water law, if adequate measures are to be taken to prevent a water loss that would eventually
affect the national welfare. 150
The cases previously discussed indicate that the Supreme Court
has altered the scope and meaning of the commerce clause sufficiently so that its authors would probably not recognize their handiwork. 151 But as Mr. Webster argued: 15 2
It is vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the
powers of Congress on several subjects. The Constitution does
not undertake the task of making such exact definitions. In conferring powers, it proceeds by the way of enumeration, stating
the powers conferred, one after another, in few words; and
where the power is general or complex in its nature, the exCourt continually asserts, 'You live under a Constitution but the Constitution
is what we say it is,' and the people incessantly reply, 'As long as your version
of the Constitution enables us to live with pride in what we consider a free
and just society, you may continue exercising this august, awesome, and altogether revocable authority."' Id. at 25.
150. The eloquent language of Mr. Justice Holmes, in speaking for the
majority in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), is worth noting: "[W]hen
we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution
of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us
must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not contravene
any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is
whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in
deciding what that Amendment has reserved." Id. at 433-34. (cited and discussed
in Hurst, The Process of Constitutional Construction, in SurPasn CouRT AND
Summm LAw 55-56 (Cahn ed. 1954). See also SHAnTE , Our LE:A, SYsTE%!
.N How IT OPERATEs 826-27 (1951); LeBoeuf, State or Federal Control of
the Water Powers of Navigable Streams, 15 GEO. L.J. 201, 205-08 (1927).
151. LeBoeuf, supra note 150, at 205. However, in THE FEDERALIST (Cooke
ed. 1961) Alexander Hamilton recognized a great future problem in commercial
intercourse when, in addressing the people of the state of New York, he said:
"The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America,
has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable
that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade,
by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their
own citizens. The infractions of these regulations on one side, the efforts to prevent them on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals
and wars." Id. at 40.
152. 6 WEBsTER, TAE WoRas oF D~ANmL WEBSTa
9 (11th ed. 1858).
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tent of the grant must necessarily be judged of, and limited
by its object, and by the nature of the power.
The present state of riparian rights and their legal effect upon the
federal government's taking and compensating is a part of the judgemade law of the United States Supreme Court. 15 3 This law should
conform to the needs and emergency of the national water problem.
Whether or not the commerce clause was intended to apply to
riparian rights on nonnavigable streams, the fact is that federal control has been judicially extended into this area. 54 This might give
rise to the question whether the United States Constitution is a rudder
rather than an anchor.155 With tremendous social changes, whether
the wording of the commerce clause could prevent the nation's progress1'5 6 is questionable at best. Regardless of one's political philosophy,
the imperatives of water needs for a growing national economy will

153. "I take judge-made law as one of the exiting realities of life. There,
before us, is the brew. Not a judge on the bench but has had a hand in the
making. The elements have not come together by chance. Some principle, however unavowed and inarticulate and subconscious, has regulated the infusion.
It may not have been the same principle for all judges at any time, nor the
same principle for any judge at all times." C~Amozo, THE NATURE OF TrE JuDrCLA PRocEss 10-11 (1921).
Compare PoumN, JusTcE AccoRDsNr TO LAW
(1951).
154. "It is very probable that all that was in the minds of the framers of
the Constitution when they drafted the Commerce Clause was to give to the
national government power to prevent the states from interfering with the freedom of interstate and foreign commerce, and, in fact, for nearly a hundred years
there was very little affirmative legislation by Congress under this constitutional
provision, and very few cases based upon it came before the Supreme Court.
More recently, however, it has been the basis of much congressional legislation,
and by liberal interpretation a vast field of regulation has been brought under
federal jurisdiction." (citations omitted.) BuaiWcK, THE LAw oF THE AmnRIAN
CoNs'rrrunoN 207 (1922). Two ideas can be derived from Dean Burdick's
statement: first, if it can be taken as a correct statement of the intent of the
framers of the Constitution, then it is apparent that riparian rights on nonnavigable streams, generally, are matters for state and individual control divorced
from the federal dominant servitude. But, second, the expanding complexity
of American twentieth century economy has forced federal inroads into nonnavigable streams. See generally Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations,
62 W. VA. L. l~v. 1 (1959). United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174
U. S.690 (1899); Trelease, Federal Limitationson State Water Law, 10 BurFALo
L. REv. 399 (1961).
155. "[No] written document could wholly restrain the excesses of democracy.
Possibly the Constitution has proved more of a rudder than an anchor; for no
state of human society is wholly static, and Constitution guides, rather than

holds."

BECic, THE CoNsTTrU oN OF

HE UN=

STATEs

271 (1924).

156. Hurst, supra note 150, at 55-58.
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inevitably push developments forward. 157 Robert Fulton's steamboat
required a new meaning for the word navigation. This progress
caused Chief Justice Marshall to interpret the commerce clause not
as a hard and fast rule but as a flexible statement to be applied by
the Court in prescribing the rules by which commerce would be
governed. These rules governed commerce from Gibbons through
Gilman and The Daniel Ball. Mr. Justice Marshall, aided by the
eloquence of Daniel Webster for the plaintiff in error Gibbons, felt
the commerce clause needed to grow with the country. Mr. Webster
had stated:' 51 8
The Constitution was formed for all the States; and Congress
was to have power to regulate commerce. Now, what is the
import of this, but that Congress is to give the rule, to establish the system, to exercise the control over the subject? And
can more than one power, in cases of this sort, give the rule,
establish the system, or exercise the control? As it is not contended that the power of Congress is to be exercised by a
supervision of State legislation, and as it is clear that Congress
is to give the general rule, I contend that this power of giving
the general rule is transferred, by the Constitution, from the
States to Congress, to be exercised as that body may see fit; and
consequently, that all those high exercises of power, which
might be considered as giving the rule, or establishing the
system, in regard to great commercial interests, are necessarily
left with Congress alone.
Case by case, year by year, the federal government has convinced
the Court that the commerce clause gives Congress the power to
control navigable waters for the purpose of "navigation." The Court
has also held that the commerce clause does not exclude waters from
federal control merely because the waters were not, in fact, being
used in interstate commerce. If the waters were susceptible of being
59
so used, they came under the federal umbrella.
It was not until 1899 that the Court began to examine federal
rights under the commerce clause in relation to nonnavigable waters.
At that time the Court concluded that the power to protect the
navigable capacity includes the control over nonnavigable tributaries
that affect navigability. 60 When the Court permits federal control
over nonnavigable as well as navigable waters in the exercise of
157. See 1 COMM'N ON ORGANzA oN or m ExEcuTrvE BRANcn or =tom
GovmarMENT,TAsK FoRcE oN WAmam REsoTmcEs ANm PowER 213-32 (1955).

158. 6 WEBSTmi,supra note 152, at 12.
159. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 WaIL) 557 (1870).
160. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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dominant servitude,1 6 and the Government is not required to pay for
water power loss and other losses under certain situations, 162 it then
becomes necessary to question the interpretation of the Constitution
under which this result was achieved. 6 3 Professor Bischoff has said:' 64
I am certain that if a layman 'has spread in front of him at
one time all of the decisions of the Supreme Court since
Marbury v. Madison he would not only lose some of the traditional American reverence for the Court but would also be
convinced that his welfare and liberty were ultimately at the
mercy of a self-conceived super-legislature instead of a court of
law.
The expanding population, coupled with the vastly expanding
federal aid programs, has given the Government a reasonable excuse
to broaden its water resource projects.' 6 5 By and large, states have
been unable, or, in some cases, unwilling, to expend the time, effort,
and money necessary to cope with the present and future water problems.'6 6 The national government has taken vast steps toward complete water control. Although at first, these steps sound most drastic,
161. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229
(1960); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
162. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). Compare United States
v. Virginia Elec. &Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
163. Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship,
48 CALiF. L. REv. 43, 45 (1960).
164. Bisehoff, The Role of Offlcial Precedents, in Surmmsm CouRT AND SvPRmE LAw 78 (Cahn ed. 1954). Compare Professor Bischoff's remaks with the
discussion in BEcK, THE VANISNGRwIGErs OF THE STATEs 22-24 (1926) as to
the role of the Constitution in relation to the citizens and their duties. The people
can permit modification of the Constitution, but where the ideals and principles
of a people are not the moving spirit of the Constitution it will be the Constitution that is ultimately destroyed. BECk, supra at 22-23.
165. Congress has continually voiced its fear for the future of water resources. For example: "It is recognized that the wastage and inadequate utilization of water resources on farm, grazing, and forest lands resulting from inadequate facilities for water storage and utilization contribute to the destruction
of natural resources, injuries to public health and public lands, droughts, periodic
floods, crop failures, decline in standards of living, and excessive dependence
upon public relief, and thereby menace the national welfare. It is therefore declared to be the policy of Congress to assist in providing facilities for water
Act of Aug. 28, 1937, ch.
storage and utilization in the United States .......
870, §1, 50 Stat. 869, amended by Act of Aug. 17, 1954, ch. 751, §1, 68 Stat.
734, amended by Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 624, §9, 74 Stat. 412. See
also Forer, supra note 147.
166. Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. B-v. 1
(1959).
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they are in keeping with the federal programs in other areas of national
1 67
welfare.
Entire new areas of sovereignty, hitherto entrusted to the state or
to no government at all, are now the subject of extensive federal
regulation and control. This control has not come as a sudden usurping of state power. During the first half of the nineteenth century the
people pushed westward. As they did so, they clamored for improved
waterways, canals, and roads to facilitate transportation of their products to market and imports to their sparsely populated areas. By 1885,
there was a growing demand for national economic controls and a
federal program of commercial regulation, on the theory that only the
national government could deal effectively with a national economy.
During the days of the rise of liberal nationalism, Justice McKenna
declared in very clear terms that the commerce power could be and
should be used to promote the general welfare:10 8
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and
nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said,
but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the
powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation
are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and morale.
It is hard to deny that the interpretation of the commerce clause
has kept pace with the thinking of the federal government and the
needs and demands of the citizenry. The changing interpretation of
the commerce clause and the Constitution in general, will no doubt
continue to be moulded by public opinion and socio-economic need.
THE CirmcAr, WATER SrrUATON
It seems that those states that maintain a riparian rights doctrine
of some form' 69 do so because they have not seriously felt the threat
of water shortage.Y-7
These secure states and their governments
167. See 1

Co~a'N ON ORGANIZTION OF THE ExECUTE BRANCH OF THE

GoVERNMENT, supra note 157.

168. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
169. See 2 S~m3, AmmmcAN WATER RE OURCES ADmN[TRATION ch. 3 (1956).
It would be incorrect to speak of the doctrine of riparian rights without first
indicating that the states still purporting to follow a riparian system by and
large have modified or combined it with some other system, making the system
more flexible in point of service. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements
in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BuFFALO L. REv. 448 (1961).
170. STAFF OF SENATE SE.ECT Comm. ON NAT'- WATm RsoUrczs, 86TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND 51, table 82 (Comm.

Print 1960). The table gives the breakdown from New England through the
Pacific region of the present supply of available water. It indicates greater avail-
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have been unwilling or unable to visualize the effect of the predicted
1
crucial water shortage. 7
Many of the water actions and responsibilities that these states
2
have not assumed have been undertaken by the federal government."'
It appears that federal control in navigable waters is as broad as the
ever increasing needs of commerce and related areas, 173 which include
watershed improvement, flood control, reclamation, recreation, and
hydro-electric power plants. Possibly only when the state is directly
affected by serious water problems will the people realize how far the
federal government, with Supreme Court sanction, has moved into
4
their heretofore local domain."'
ability of water in the eastern states.

Compare HAA & GORDON, LEGISLATIVE
CHANGE OF WATER LAW IN MASSACHuSErS wivm THE LAw OF WAmE ALLOCATION IN =u EAsTm_ STATES 1 (Harbor & Bergen ed. 1956).
171. "At present we use about 270 billion gallons per day. Demands Will
increase until by 1980 we will be using almost 600 billion gallons per day. The
increase in the 31 eastern states will be almost 200 percent, but only about 50
percent in the western states. This regional difference is significant because use
in the western states is pre-dominantly irrigational, whereas in the eastern states
it is pre-dominantly industrial. Therefore, the greatest increase will be in nonconsumptive use."
STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NAT'L WATER RESOURCES, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESs. 10, 11 (Comm. Print. 1959). However, it is en-

couraging to note that many eastern states have set up commissions to look into
the water problem. Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L.
REv. 1, 2-5 (1959) (see especially 2-3 n.4). The future value these commissions
will have in setting forth future state water law policy will have little effect upon
this discussion as the point in question, rights of riparians in navigable and nonnavigable streams with relation to the federal government, now seems to be
firmly embedded in the decisional process of the United States Supreme Court.
172. Cerker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CAmIF. L. BEv. 604 (1957); Munro, The Pelton Decision:
A New Riparianism?, 86 ORE. L. REv. 221 (1957). This does not mean that
inactivity alone caused dominant federal control over water resources; the states
could not have avoided the federal dominant servitude. It would be hard to
overcome the judicial interpretation of the present role of the Government in
water development. See, e.g., First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). It would not be accurate to infer that the
Supreme Court has completely lost sight of the role of the state in water control.
"[Als to every stream within its dominion a State may change [the] common
law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes
as it deems wise." United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690,
702-03 (1899). But this power granted to the states to legislate for the interests
of its own citizens is only granted when the federal government has not asserted
its superior power granted through the evolution of the Court's broadening of
the commerce clause.
173. See, e.g., Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO
L. REv. 899 (1961).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 868 U.S. 229
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The water problems existing in the United States are becoming
more and more acute as the population explodes and industry
grows.175 In part, the problems are the result of many water-use activities expanding more rapidly than the overall economy. 170 For example, in 1944, 20.5 million acres of land were irrigated. In 1958,
the number of acres of irrigated lands had risen to 34 million, an increase of sixty-two per cent. However, from 1944 to 1958 the total
agricultural output lagged far behind in growth. 1 77 Industry's use of
water has far surpassed expectation.1 78 State recreation needs will
greatly multiply with the anticipated increase of leisure time. 179
(1960); Okllahoma v. Atkinson, 318 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). Compare the conclusion in LeBoeuf, State or
Federal Control of the Water Powers of Navigable Streams, 15 GEo. L.J. 201,
230-233 (1927) with the proposal set forth in Forer, Water Supply: Suggested
Federal Regulation, 75 HAv. L. REv. 382, 337-49 (1961).
175. STAFF OF SENATE SELECT CommI. ON NAT'L WATER REsoumcrs, 86Tmx
CONG.,

2D SESS., REPORT ON NATiONAL WATER REsouRcEs AND PROBLEMS

1

(Comm. Print 1960). Many states are being warned: "The use of water inevitably creates legal problems; Illinois has had relatively few such difficulties because of the abundance of water in most parts of the state. Concrete problems are
beginning to appear, however, and a great many more are waiting in the wings,
ready to move on stage as shortages become more acute." CIUBnsr, ILLINOIS
WATn PGHTs LAw IV (Comm. Rep. 1958).
176. STAF OF SENATE SELECT Com. oN NAT'L WATER RESOuRcEs, 86TH
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON WATER SUPPLY AN

DEmAND (Comm.

Print 1960).

177. Ibid. Mr. Wellman measured agricultural output in constant dollars,
concluding that the rate of growth was less than one-half that of irrigated acreage. See also Huffman, The Role of Private Enterprise in Water Resources Development, 22 LAW & CoNTmrt'. PROB. 433, 437-39 (1957).
178. STAFF OF SENATE SELECT CozaiM. ON NAT'L WATER REsoucEs, 86TH
CONG., 21 Sass., REPORT ON FuToun WATER REQuIunmNTS OF PiunciPAL WATERUsiNG INDusTams (Comm. Print 1960). For example: the growth date in water
use in the principal industries can be shown as follows:
Index of production: 1947 = 100
Industry
1954 Rate of water use growth
Pulp and paper
133
Chemicals
153
Petroleum refining
140
Primary aluminum
247
All manufacturing
127
Food
105
Pig iron and steel
107
From STAFF OF SENATE SELECT Co v. ON NAT'L WATER REsoUncEs, supra
note 176, at 2.

179.

STAFF OF SENATE SELECT Comm£x.

ON NAT'L WATER REsouncEs,

86TH

2D SEss., REPORT ON WATER RECREATION NFEs nq THE UNTED STATES,
1960-2000 (Comm. Print 1960): "Probably the major portion of outdoor recreation is associated with water areas and the future demands in this respect are
CONG.,
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If these figures are correct, then future economic and governmental
development might weigh in favor of the state or states having the
best access to and control of water.180 This analysis should cause
states to re-examine their present water resources and water doctrine.181 States with water advantages have in both the past and
present been able to attract industry and labor. These attractions
tend to improve the economic conditions of the state. At the same
time, these attractions frequently have brought with them a major
water problem. 182 In part, the problem resulting from increased industry is water pollution. It is discussed here only to serve as one
83
example of a critical water problem with which states must cope.
While the states are attempting to find an answer acceptable to all
concerned, the nation's streams and watercourses suffer greatly from
various forms of pollution. 8 4

The pollution of numerous water resources is of concern not only
to the individual water consumer and the state, but also to the national
government. The question becomes one of the right or the duty of
the federal government to intercede and establish uniform water
controls. Under what authority could the Government act?
Status of State Planning as Affected by the Commerce Clause
It has been demonstrated that the commerce clause grants to the
Government broad authority when the improvement of navigation or
the control of commerce is involved. The basic problems heretofore
posed do not appear to be commerce clause questions. However, it
is clear that the federal government has gained extremely broad
indicated by estimations that total outdoor recreation visitation to national parks,

national forests, state parks, county parks, and municipal parks will reach 8
billion by the year 2000." Id. at 1.
180. Davis, Water and the Law, in WATER EEsorncEs Aim
I LAw 40-41
(1958).
181. See Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What Is Their Future
Common, Ground?, in WATER REsouncEs AND nix LAW 7 (1958).
182. STAFF OF SENATE SELEcT Coiw. ON NAT'L WATER REsouRcEs, 86TH
CONG., 24 SEss., REPORT ON PoLLuinoN ABATEmEN 9-19 (Comm. Print 1960);
Davis supra note 180, at 41-42.
183. 2 Simr, AimmcA WATER REsomcEs ADimNrsTRATroN 692-703 (1956).
It is interesting to note that in 1956 another writer commenting upon state
attempts to legislate and thereby control pollution of waters as well as other
water problems, felt that the riparian east did declare policy but did not imple-

ment the declarations with concrete effective legislation. Ellis, Some Current and
Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IowA L. Rxv. 237,

239 (1956).
184. Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75 HAnv. L.
332,334-35 (1961).
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powers under the commerce clause. How, then, may the states exercise their proper responsibilities and planning?18 5
Mr. Justice Burton in First Iowa Hydro-electric Co-op. v. Federal
Power Commission1 8 6 reiterated the fact that state planning must always take into consideration the superior right of the federal government to control navigation and all other related rights subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court: 18 7
The securing of an Iowa state permit is not in any sense a
condition precedent or an administrative procedure that must
be exhausted before securing a federal license. It is a procedure required by the State of Iowa in dealing with its local
streams and also with the waters of the United States within
that State in the absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by the
United States over the navigability of its waters. Now that
the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of such waters
under the Federal Power Act, it has not by statute or regulation added the state requirements to its federal requirements.
First Iowa helped to place states in the position of either ignoring
federal projects or carefully weighing their future prospects of water
control to promote navigation, flood control power production, irrigation, or recreation, in light of federal policy.
In the first Arizona v. California,18 the state of Arizona complained that the Boulder Canyon Project Act'1 9 invaded quasi-sovereign rights of the state because the act permitted the Government to
proceed without abiding by state law which required them to submit
the plans for the dam to the state engineer for his approval. The
185. It does not appear that the Government has any intention of thwarting
state initiative, but in an area so precious to human existence where it is clear
that a state is unable to adequately control water problems, should not the
Government then act to prevent a possible water crisis? Compare Forer, supra
note 184, at 83742, Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water
Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 626, 627 (1957), and Trelease, Federal Limitations on
State Water Law, 10 BtnFsAIo L. REv. 899, 402-06 (1961) with STAFF OF SzqATE SELcT Com2 . oN NAT'. WAr
RsouRcEs, 87T CoNG., 1sT SFss., REoRT
ON NAT'L WATER REsouRcEs 20-22 (Comm. Print 1961).

186. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).

187. Id. at 170. The Court would, however, agree that "The power of the
State to . . . legislate for the interests of its own citizens is conceded, and
until in some way Congress asserts its superior power, and the necessity of pre-

serving the general interests of the people of all the States, it is assumed that
state action, although involving temporarily an obstruction to the free navigability
of a stream, is not subject to challenge." United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
188. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).

189. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
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Court in rejecting Arizona's claim relied upon the Government's
power over navigation to decide the case. 9 0 The Court refused to
examine congressional motives behind the project:' 91
Into the motives which induced members of Congress to
enact the Boulder Canyon Project Act, this Court may not inquire.... The Act declares that the authority to construct the
dam and reservoir is conferred, among other things, for the purpose of "improving navigation and regulating the flow of the
river." As the river is navigable and the means which the Act
provides are not unrelated to the control of navigation . . .
the erection and maintenance of such dam and reservoir are
clearly within the powers conferred upon Congress. Whether
the particular structures proposed are reasonably necessary, is
not for this Court to determine. . . . And the fact that purposes other than navigation will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those
other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of
Congressional power.
Thus so long as federal ingress presents some aspect of proper
congressional control the Court will not strike it down. This is especially true where it can be demonstrated that the project will produce wide-spread benefits, even though a single state is inconvenienced
or the project is such that local interests are unable or unwilling to
meet the expense. 192 An example of the latter would be in the area
of pollution control wherein the offenders are generally the municipalities themselves or local industry upon which the community is
economically dependent 93 Lack of aggressive state action continues
to force federal planning and resources to counter obvious water
problems. 94 An example of the former occurs when the Court is being
called upon to weigh a state's interest against national interest.
190. Arizona v. California, supra note 188, at 455-56.
191. Ibid. The basic notion that if Congress has exercised constitutional power
the Court will not interfere was reiterated recently by Mr. Justice Black in
Arizona v. California, 83 Sup. Ct. 1468 (1963).
192. STAFF OF SENATE SErr Comm. ON NATI WATER RqsouRcEs, supra
note 185, at 23. See generally Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw & CoNT p. PROB. 325, 326-28 (1957); Lepsksky, Water
Resources and American Federalism,44 Am. POL. Scr. R1v. 631, 637-38 (1950).
193. Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern
States, Particularly as Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159, 166 (1952). For a
better understanding of the enormity of the pollution problem see STAFF OF
SENATE SELECT Commn . ON NAT'L WAmE

REsouncEs, supra note 185.

194. Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. Rnv. 1, 24-31
(1959). The author indicates an active role for the state in this area, but passive
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In Oklahoma v. Atkinson 95 the Court was called upon, in part, to
make such a decision. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
after reviewing the reason and need for the Denison Dam and Reservoir Project, concluded that the national interest far outweighed
that of the complaining state. He further stated that any loss to the
state of revenue or property would be no barrier to the federal project.
Upholding the Government in effect also further permitted the
Government to block navigable waters by being allowed to build
certain obstructions thereon. The theory was that by obstructing one
segment of the river, navigation would thereby be improved. 19
Conversely, as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Sanitary District
of Chicago v. United States,1 7 the Government has the power to "remove obstructions to interstate and foreign commerce. There is no
question that this power is superior to that of the States to provide
for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants."19 8 The language
of Mr. Justice Holmes appears to limit federal rights in this area to
situations wherein certain obstructions affect interstate or foreign
commerce. However, it is clear that nonnavigable streams also come
within any ruling that would affect the federal dominant servitude.' 9 9
The problem of navigability continued to hinder government
planning, which needed room to develop its comprehensive power
program, stemming from United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater
Power Co. 20 0 In the Chandler-Dunbardecision it was held that the
Government could develop water power at a navigation dam and
could sell all excess power over and above its needs. Chandler-Dunbar further established the proposition that if the main purpose of a
response to any aggressive policy. He further charges that the federal pollution
program is in for serious examination, not to increase, but to decrease the role
of the Government in water purity: "If the Federal Water Pollution Control
program is scrapped, we will have lost the only significant gain that has been
made in this area in recent years." Id. at 38.
195. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
196. Id. at 534.
197. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
198. Id. at 426. In the absence of congressional action the Court, of course,
does not have the authority to declare obstructions unlawful. See, e.g., Willamette
Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). See generally
Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAx. L. Ev.
626 (1957). This right to remove obstructions also includes destruction or modification of bridges, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); dams
or other obstructions, Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113
(1921).
200. 229 U.S. 53 (1913). See Fox, National Water Resources Policy Issues,
22 LAw & CoNTraM. PROB. 472, 490-99 (1957).
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project is within legitimate congressional control, then any incidental
activity would be permitted.
By 1940 the Government was clearly in the business of generating
hydro-electric power.20 1 "Navigation improvement" seemed to be a
mere verbal formula that still had to be used. In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. 202 the expansion of power production
reached the point at which the Government no longer had to worry
about the "navigation in fact" test in setting up its projects. The test
applied in Appalachian Electric Power Co. could conceivably be
applied to any watercourse in the nation.203 With the Court upholding the Government's power projects the Federal Power Commission
continued to expand. The Commission was permitted to take private
water rights for hydro-electric development without paying for any
value of the flow of the stream 204 or other special value that the land
might have.20 5 Any private riparian owner who attempted to exercise his riparian right in opposition, even though unwittingly, to the
exercise of federal power was forced to retreat before or surrender to
the superior rights of the Government. Almost all rights to water control and use are subject to close federal scrutiny. 20 6
Water control and development assumes many shapes. Sometimes
states are hostile toward federal intervention; at other times they welcome federal aid. As in many other areas of state and federal
relationship, if the state solicits federal aid in water control the state
must also accept certain federal controls that ultimately accompany
201. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
For an excellent discussion of the purpose and reason for the Tennessee Valley
Authority see Martin, The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study of Federal Control, 22 LAw & CoNteAin. POB. 351 (1957).
202. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
203. The test as set out in the opinion, id. at 407-10 has been discussed at
length supra note 34. Briefly, however, it now seems that if any waters can be
made navigable in fact they will be classified as navigable waters even though

Congress had not intended nor contemplated such improvements.
204. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 850 U.S. 222 (1956).

Any judi-

cial interpretation as to what constitutes navigability in a stream applied as well

to locations for power sites. If the effect upon navigation could be shown, the
power project was relieved of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n
v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
205. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945);
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Thus there

can be no private property right in the flow of a stream. "This has no assessable
value to the riparian owner. If the Government were now to build the dam, it
would have to pay the fair value, judicially determined, for the fast land; nothing
for the water power. (citations omitted). United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., supra at 427.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
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the aid. In the area of flood control, the courts are willing to hold
that the control of floods is essential to navigation and, therefore,
within the framework of governmental action. 20 7 Because of economic considerations affecting state, private industry, and individual
alike, the federal flood management activities are generally not
hindered by state or local litigation.2 8

When, however, the Govern-

ment combines flood control with subsidiary features such as hydroelectric power production,20 9 then state and local interests are
offended and react negatively. 210 The protests are to little or no
avail. The economic loss to local interests resulting from the power
granted to the federal government under the commerce clause,
coupled with the loss resulting from the flooding of certain lands and
their consequent uselessness, has given the Government firm ground
upon which to pursue its program in the national interest.
The Limitations Upon IndividualRiparianRights
The riparian owner is concerned about his right to compensation
when his land and water use has been injured by a governmental
project. Basically his rights in the water must emit from the state.
He cannot claim rights that the state could not claim, unless, of course,
he falls within one of the exceptions whereby the Government can
license private parties over state objections.2 11 Thus, since states are
limited by federal supremacy so also is the individual. State licens207. United States v. West Va. Power Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941). See generally STAvF oF SENATE SELCT Comm. oN
NAT'L WATER REsOURCEs, 86TH CONG., 2D

SEss.,

REPOrT ON FLOODS AND FLoOD

for a complete summary of the enormity of the
flood control problem facing the nation.
CONTRoL (Comm. Print 1960),

208. Fox, National Water Resources Policy Issues, 22 LAw & CoNTEMn. PnOB.
472, 475-81 (1957); Martz, supra.note 171, at 49-51.
209. Congress clearly intended that all allied purposes that could fit under

flood control should be pursued. Thus the general definition of flood control contains the following language: "The words 'flood control' . . . shall be construed
to include channel and major drainage improvements, and Federal investigations
and improvements of rivers and other waterways for flood control and allied purposes shall be under the jurisdiction of . . . the War Department..... Act of
Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, §2, 58 Stat. 889.
210. The Court first has clearly established the principle that flood control
activities extend to tributaries of all navigable streams. Oklahoma v. Atkinson,
313 U.S. 508 (1941); and second, the fact that other aims, other than flood control, are sought to be accomplished will not invalidate nor in any way effect the
exercise of the project and its related works. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423
(1931). See also Hart, Governing the Missouri, 41 IowA L. REv. 198, 199-201
(1956).
211. See, e.g., First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328

U.S. 152 (1946).
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ing, state grants, and state planning have no effect upon federal water
rights. 212 Yet the Government, with its vast power, does not seem to
want to subvert state authority altogether. 213 States are still permitted to deal with purely state water matters. They encounter difficulties only when their regulations infringe upon or affect federal rights
granted by the Constitution to the Congress as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.214
Just as it has been the function of the courts to determine the
proper limits to federal powers, so it has been the function of Congress
to determine whether to take full advantage of all of its powers under
21 5
the commerce clause. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.
permitted Congress to use all, or just a part of its power in water law.
This in turn allowed state activity in areas wherein Congress elected
not to intrude. If this is a correct interpretation, then states have
more freedom than that to which they will admit or for which they
will take responsibility.
Inadequate Federal-StateRelationshipsin Water Development
Federal water power is clearly superior to any form of state authority. Yet, state and federal cooperation has long been advocated2 1as6
one method of allowing states a voice in federal water projects.
Generally, the states are not willing to expend vast amounts of money
for water improvements if they feel that there is a possibility of federal
interference that might cause the project to be lost to or modified by
the federal government. Another factor is that most states cannot
afford proper water development costs without federal aid. Water
development must be accelerated if water resources are going to keep
up with population expansion. A recent report to Congress 2 17 indicated that the present water shortages are of sufficient magnitude to
cause national concern. The report estimated future water shortages
and suggested how to solve or at least abate them.218 What role
then must the states play in answering the water needs?
212. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atlinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
213. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
214. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Clyde, Current
Developments in Water Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 725, 727-80 (1959).
215. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
216. Trelease, supra note 185, at 418-19.
217. STAFF OF SENATE SELEcr Comn. ON NAT'L WATER REsouRcEs, 87TH
CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON NAT'L WATER REsouRcEs 22-23 (Comm. Print 1961).
218. "With its abundant supply of good water, and its advanced technology
and skills, the United States need never suffer for lack of water. Water shortage
can be alleviated. The lack of water need not limit our economic destiny. But
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It has been indicated that state water policy is almost completely
subservient to federal policy. States can only act on a local level,
and then only when they in no way affect federal interests. A few
states have undertaken vast intra-state projects to help alleviate water problems. One such project worthy of note is the California
Feather River Project. Although the state in question is, in effect,
nonriparian, a look at the project will serve as an example of what a
far-sighted and progressive state might do even in the face of federal
objection and enormous federal power and resources.
Californiaand the FeatherRiver Project-Effective State Planning?
In November 1960, the people of California2 10 approved a state
bond issue in the amount of 1%billion dollars to support a project
that would, in effect, bring the waters of the Feather River from the
northern to the southern portion of the state. The water would be
carried over a transmission system, 22 0 which, when ultimately completed, would cost in excess of 11 billion dollars.22 1 The reason California desperately needed a workable water resource project is that
ninety-eight per cent of the state's water supply is in the northern
area.22 2 Over one-half of the state's population is located in the
southern portion of the state with seventy-seven per cent of the total
water demands.2 23 In the past, volatile state politics have prevented
so ambitious a project. 22 4 This project will achieve great strides
toward the solution of California's water problems by a more efficient
and equitable distribution of the water resources available within
positive actions must be substituted for complacency." (emphasis added.) Id.
at 2.
219. Note, State Water Development: Legal Aspects of Californids FeatherRiver Project, 12 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1960).
220. See the diagram setting out the present and future project planning in
California in the San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1959, p. 34; also CAL. WATER
CODE §§12930-42 (1961).
221. STAFF or SENATE Szzcr Cownai. oN NAT'L WATER REsouRCEs, 87TE
CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON NAT'L WATER REsouRcEs 65 (Comm. Print 1961).
But see the answer to this figure by Senator Douglas in 105 CONG. IEc. 7672
(1959): "Mr. President, the huge figure which my friend from California brandishes about, $11 billion, has in it a typical degree of California exaggeration."
222. San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1959, p. 34, col. 1.
223. Ibid.
224. The northern portion of the state contends that it is giving away a precious asset, water, without any means of adequate protection, while the southern
citizens fear that they will be overcharged and forced to take water in amounts
at the discretion of their northern neighbors and without respect to need. San
Francisco Chronicle, supra note 222.
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the state.2 25 The major costs of the project will
be borne by the per226
sons who benefit from the new water facilities.
Along with this optimistic step by California to alleviate a grave
water problem, boils a conflict that promises to include nearly every
aspect of federal-state water relationships. 227 In order to successfully complete the project federal funds will be necessary. The contribution of funds brings with it close federal scrutiny of the entire
project. 228 Many persons in California would prefer to avoid this
scrutiny.2 2 9 The state wants to undertake and finance a state water
225. The intent of the project planners is that the major units of the project
would be operational by the mid 1970's, thus being able to take care of California's water problems at least through the mid 1980's. Then additional projects
would be activated. The major portion and expense of the project would go to
the construction of the Oroville Dam and Reservoir and the 570 mile San Joaquin
Valley-Southern California Aqueduct. It is worth noting that this dam would be,
when completed, the largest in the world as well as the most expensive. There
would be some federal aid for flood control. Californians contend that this would
be a very small share of the total amount. (But see 105 CoNG. REC. 7855
(1959)). The program will be multi-purpose, the Oroville Dane would also
include a 440,000 kilowatt power plant plus state flood control protection as well
as anticipated recreational value to the general public. There would be, in
effect, a new river serving the entire state of California. San Francisco Chronicle,
supra note 222.
226. Note, State Water Development: Legal Aspects of California's Feather
River Project, supra note 219.
227. Just to list one problem that upset the Kerr Committee on national water
resources-while the California voters and planners were considering the adoption
of the Feather River Project, attorneys for the federal government claimed that
when the United States acquired California, under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the federal government "became the owner of all lands and all
rights to use water within the area. The ownership is still retained unless it has
been divested pursuant to act of Congress. There has been no such divestment."
(City of Fresno v. State Water Rights Board, Cal. Super. Ct., Fresno County, No.
105245, cited in REPORT OF ToE STAFr' OF SENATE SELEcT Commrd. oN NAT'L
WATER RESOURCES, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON NAT'L WATE

REsouRcEs

(Comm. Print 1961)). The committee reports went on to discuss the damaging
effects such assertions might have on state water planning as well as state and
federal relations. Id. at 66.
228. See 105 CoNe. REc. 7665-91 (1959). Taylor, Excess Land Laws
Secretary's Decision? A Study in Administration of Federal-State Relations, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1962).
229. 105 CONG. REc. 7669 (1959) (remarks of Senator Douglas). Further, in
discussing one "vital link" in the proposed Feather River Project, Senator Morse
commented, "[Llet the record show that I think that if our amendment [an attempt to strengthen the 160 acre land limitation] is not adopted, the bill will be
a water 'steal' by the various large landowners the Senator from Illinois has just
now listed in the Record." Id. at 7670. The reason for the term "vital link" is
that the Feather River Project cannot stand by itself separate from the San Lis
Reservoir; the "Feather River Project is dependent physically upon construction
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project. At the same time, the state needs federal funds for the project 230 but desires to avoid any form of federal regulation.23 l The
federal government, at least for the present, is willing to allow the
state to embark on the huge water project. However, it is not so
naive as to lose sight of federal interests.23 2 It stands ready to put
federal machinery to work when necessary.
The battle lines are clearly drawn between conflicting state and
national interests. If the dilemma cannot be worked out to the satisfaction of these conflicting interests, then it seems clear that the
Court will support the federal government in its demands upon the
state.

233

CONCLUSION

The federal government has been given, or has assumed, the
responsibility for the development of limited resources that are vital
to both the individual and the national welfare. Water is among the
most important of the limited resources. It is understandable, therefore, that water use and development is no longer a state or local
matter; it is a major national function.23 4 The federal government
of San Luis Reservoir as a means of getting water southward into the southern
San Joaquin Valley and beyond." Taylor, supra note 228, at 16.
230. Senator Douglas cleared up the misunderstanding started by Senator
Engle when he had stated that the project was entirely an operation financed by
the state. "The Oroville Dam and so-called State service area project are not a
separate state project. It will all be a joint project. Previously, they [referring to
the remarks of the senior and junior Senators of California] have been saying this
would be a 100 percent state project. But it turns out to be nothing of the sort.
A large part of the basic cost of the Oroville project is to be charged to the
Federal government, in the case of the flood control, and possibly navigation costs;
and only the residue or the irrigation costs, are to be borne by the state government.
"[D]espite all these Federal contributions, the Senators from California do not
want the Federal reclamation law to apply except in the so-called Federal service
area in the valley." 105 CONG. .Ec. 7855 (1959) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
231. Taylor, supra note 228, at 7.
232. An apt quote cited in Taylor, supra note 228, at 18, is worthy of note:
"It certainly is naive for the State Chamber to expect the federal government to
hand over to the state the two revenue producing facilities-irrigation and power
-while retaining responsibilities for flood control, navigation, salinity control, and
fish and wildlife development which the State Chamber says are 'not reimbursable
costs and are, under any circumstances, gifts from the federal government."' Letter From Harold Ickes to Frank Clarvce, Oct. 31, 1945. Compare similar language
in 105 CoNG. Eec. 7855 (1959) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
233. Senator Morse clearly understands the position of the Government and
the current thinking of the Court on one aspect of the subject in question as indicated by his language in 105 CoNG. Ec. 7683 (1959).
234. For recommendations on how to cope with the present and future water
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seems to be the logical choice to develop and protect the nation's water resources. The Government has the money, scientists, planners,
skilled technicians, and, most important, the commerce clause.
Through its interpretation of the commerce clause, the Supreme
Court has granted to the federal government complete control over
navigable waters and qualified control over nonnavigable waters.
Riparian rights have fallen before federal power to aid navigation
along navigable streams. The Court has found that if a nonnavigable
stream "affected commerce" along a navigable stream, it, too, is subject
to federal power or dominant servitude. Whether the particular
federal act or appropriation would be a sufficient "taking" to satisfy the
fifth amendment, and, therefore, call for recompense, is not clear.
There has been no definitive pronouncement by the Court as to what
is or is not a compensable "taking." There are times when the Government will be relieved of any financial burden, enabling it to appropriate certain riparian interests without compensation. Although
the Court classifies these injuries as consequential, there is nevertheless an appropriation without compensation so far as the riparian
owner is concerned.
If Congress were fully to comprehend the magnitude and complexity of urban as well as industrial water problems, and elect to
adopt remedial measures, the commerce clause could be used to great
advantage to support the federal position.
The present state of uncertainty has placed eastern riparian laws
in an unusually insecure position. The riparian owners do not want
to give up their state-granted right to water. Therefore, in effect, they
aid and abet the predicted water shortage. The national government
can take away, when necessary, the riparian right. The Government, however, would prefer state action and cooperation. State water policy is frequently in a state of flux. 2 3 5 Thus since neither side

has been able or willing to work out a solution, the Supreme Court
has been burdened with the task of deciding the matter and attempting to establish a workable system.
It should not be the job of the nation's highest judicial body to act
as a referral agency for water resource problems. There should be
an impartial commission authorized to adopt water policies that
would adhere to the national needs and yet consider the role of the
individual and the state in this democratic government. 23 6

If this

problems see 1 Cown!'N ON OncANIzAn7oN OF THE ExECuMM BRANCH or THE
Gov nNmfr, supra note 157.
235. Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their Future Common Ground?, in WATmRitsonncEs AND Thm LAw 23 (1958).
236. Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulations, 75 H~nv. L. REv.
332,347-49 (1961).
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were done, the riparian proprietor would probably continue to find
himself caught in the middle of the federal-state conflict. He would
no doubt suffer a temporary setback. The benefits resulting from
such a solution would, however, be sufficient to compensate for the
initial loss.
It is important that the riparian rights doctrine be altered to remove the concept of absolute water use and property "rights." This
would enable a more efficient use of the available water supply.
The Supreme Court has expanded the commerce clause to meet
modem needs and to help protect a national treasury. 23' The
Court
2 38
seems to echo the sentiments of Daniel Webster when he said:
It is in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the
powers of Congress on several subjects. The Constitution does
not undertake the task of making such definitions. In conferring powers, it proceeds by way of enumerating, stating the
powers conferred, one after another, in a few words; and where
the power is general or complex in its nature, the extent of the
grant must necessarily be judged of and limited, by its object,
and by the nature of the power.
Many persons feel that the federal government has neither correctly judged the complexity of this serious problem, nor utilized the
full force of its power. Now, however, is not the time for a lengthy
debate over the wisdom of the Government's actions. It is the hour
for serious cooperation in working out a more efficient system of water
use and management.23 9 There is a crucial water shortage facing the
United States.240 If the states are unwilling to reshape their thinking, then the federal government will be forced to move forward without them. This would leave all persons and states and the Government in needless and sterile conflict.
If each state would consider its influence in national development,2 41 rather than narrowly concluding that its sphere is wholly
237. Id. at 349.
238. 6 WEnsmT, THE WoRns or DANmL WEBsTm 9 (11th ed. 1858).
239. "In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of
the United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation....
In
truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its
waters. Navigability . . . is but a part of this whole ....
That authority
[granted to Congress under the Constitution] is as broad as the needs of commerce." Mr. Justice Reed speaking for the majority in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
240. See generally STAFF or SENATE SELECT Com ¢. oN NAT'L WATER Esormc s, 87T CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON NAT'L WATEa REusounczs (Comm.
Print 1961).
241. Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw &
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within its borders, the nation would fare better in all phases of national as well as state and individual welfare.
The common problem, yours, mine, everyone's
Is not to fancy what were fair in life
Provided it could be; but finding first
What may be, then find how to make it fair
2 42
Up to our means-a very different thing.

CorEm.
PhoB. 325, 331 (1957).
242. Words of Robert Browning quoted in ANDERSON, TAE
STATES, RVALS oR PATNmis?

NATION Alm THE

252 (1955).
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